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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling on homosexual marriage
released November 18, 2003
Hillary GOODRIDGE & others [FN1] vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH &
another. [FN2] SJC-08860, November 18, 2003
Unofficial Synopsis Prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
The Supreme Judicial Court held today that "barring an individual from
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution." The court stayed the entry of judgment
for 180 days "to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may
deem appropriate in light of this opinion."
"Marriage is a vital social institution," wrote Chief Justice Margaret
H. Marshall for the majority of the Justices. "The exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual
support; it brings stability to our society. For those who choose to
marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of
legal, financial, and social benefits. In turn it imposes weighty
legal, financial, and social obligations." The question before the
court was "whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution,"
the Commonwealth could deny those protections, benefits, and
obligations to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.
In ruling that the Commonwealth could not do so, the court observed
that the Massachusetts Constitution "affirms the dignity and equality
of all individuals," and "forbids the creation of second-class
citizens." It reaches its conclusion, the court said, giving "full
deference to the arguments made by the Commonwealth." The
Commonwealth, the court ruled, "has failed to identify any
constitutionality adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-
sex couples."
The court affirmed that it owes "great deference to the Legislature to
decide social and policy issues." Where, as here, the
constitutionality of a law is challenged, it is the "traditional and
settled role" of courts to decide the constitutional question. The
"marriage ban" the court held, "works a deep and scarring hardship" on
same-sex families "for no rational reason." It prevents children of
same-sex couples "from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow
from the assurance of 'a stable family structure in which children
will be reared, educated, and socialized."' "It cannot be rational
under our laws," the court held, "to penalize children by depriving
them of State benefits" because of their parents' sexual orientation.
The court rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the primary purpose
of marriage was procreation. Rather, the history of the marriage laws
in the Commonwealth demonstrates that "it is the exclusive and
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the
begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of marriage."
The court remarked that its decision "does not disturb the fundamental
value of marriage in our society." "That same-sex couples are willing
to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual
support, and commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring
place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit," the court
stated.
The opinion reformulates the common-law definition of civil marriage
to mean "the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others. Nothing that "civil marriage has long been
termed a 'civil right,"' the court concluded that "the right to marry
means little if it does not include the right to marry the person of
one's choice, subject to appropriate government restrictions in the
interests of public health, safety, and welfare."
Justices John M. Greaney, Roderick L. Ireland, and Judith A. Cowin
joined in the court's opinion. Justice Greaney also filed a separate
concurring opinion.
Justices Francis X. Spina, Martha B. Sosman, and Robert J. Cordy each
filed separate dissenting opinions.
Justice Greaney concurred "with the result reached by the court, the
remedy ordered, and much of the reasoning in the court's opinion," but
expressed the view that "the case is more directly resolved using
traditional equal protection analysis." He stated that to withhold
"relief from the plaintiffs, who wish to marry, and are otherwise
eligible to marry, on the ground that the couples are of the same
gender, constitutes a categorical restriction of a fundamental right."
Moreover, Justice Greaney concluded that such a restriction is
impermissible under art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
In so doing, Justice Greaney did not rely on art. 1, as amended in
1976, because the voters' intent in passing the amendment was clearly
not to approve gay marriage, but he relied on well-established
principles of equal protection that antedated the amendment.
Justice Cordy, with whom Justice Spina and Justice Sosman joined,
dissented on the ground that the marriage statute, as historically
interpreted to mean the union of one man and one woman, does not
violate the Massachusetts Constitution because "the Legislature could
rationally conclude that it furthers the legitimate State purpose of
ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social structure for
the bearing and raising of children." Justice Cordy stated that the
court's conclusions to the contrary are unsupportable in light of "the
presumption of constitutional validity and significant deference
afforded to legislative enactments, and the 'undesirability of the
judiciary substituting its notion of correct policy for that of a
popularly elected legislature' responsible for making it.' Further,
Justice Cordy stated that "[w]hile 'the Massachusetts Constitution
protects matters of personal liberty against government intrusion at
least as zealously and often more so than does the Federal
Constitution,' this case is not about government intrusions into
matters of personal liberty," but "about whether the State must
endorse and support [the choices of same-sex couples] by changing the
institution of civil marriage to make its benefits, obligations, and
responsibilities applicable to them." Justice Cordy concluded that,
although the plaintiffs had made a powerful case for the extension of
the benefits and burdens of civil marriage to same-sex couples, the
issue "is one deeply rooted in social policy" and 'that decision must
be made by the Legislature, not the court."
Justice Spina, in a separately filed dissenting opinion, stated that
"[W]hat is at stake in this case is not the unequal treatment of
individuals or whether individuals rights have been impermissibly
burdened, but the power of the Legislature to effectuate social change
without interference from the courts, pursuant to art. 30 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights." He emphasized that the "power to
regulate marriage lies with the Legislature, not with the judiciary."
Justice Sosman, in a separately filed dissenting opinion, stated that
"the issue is not whether the Legislature's rationale behind [the
statutory scheme being challenged] is persuasive to [the court]," but
whether it is "rational" for the Legislature to "reserve judgment" on
whether changing the definition of marriage "can be made at this time
without damaging the institution of marriage or adversely affecting
the critical role it has played in our society." She concluded that,
"[a]bsent consensus on the issue (which obviously does not exist), or
unanimity amongst scientists studying the issue (which also does not
exist), or a more prolonged period of observation of this new family
structure (which has not yet been possible), it is rational for the
Legislature to postpone any redefinition of marriage that would
include same-sex couples until such time as it is certain that
redefinition will not have unintended and undesirable social
consequences."
Top
Hillary GOODRIDGE & others [FN1] vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH &
another.
[FN2]
SJC-08860
March 4, 2003. - November 18, 2003.
Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, &
Cordy, JJ.
License. Marriage. Statute, Construction. Constitutional Law, Police
power, Equal protection of laws. Due Process of Law, Marriage. Words,
"Marriage."
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 11,
2001.
The case was heard by Thomas E. Connolly, J., on motions for summary
judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate
review.
Mary Lisa Bonauto (Gary D. Buseck with her) for Hillary Goodridge.
Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Public
Health.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
Joseph P.J. Vrabel, Mark D. Mason, & Martin W. Healy for Massachusetts
Bar Association.
Leslie Cooper & James D. Esseks, of New York, Jon W. Davidson &
Shannon Minter, of California, Elliot M. Mincberg & Judith E.
Schaeffer, of the District of Columbia, & John Reinstein, Sarah R.
Wunsch, Paul Holtzman, & Hugh Dun Rappaport for Urban League of
Eastern Massachusetts & others.
Paul Benjamin Linton, of Illinois, & Thomas M. Harvey for Robert J.
Araujo & others.
Dwight G. Duncan for Massachusetts Family Institute, Inc., & others.
Glen Lavy, of Arizona, Stephen W. Reed, of California, & Bertin C.
Emmons for National Association for Research and Therapy of
Homosexuality, Inc., & others.
Robert W. Ash & Vincent P. McCarthy, of Connecticut, & Philip E.
Cleary for The Common Good Foundation & others.
Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Mark L. Shurtleff,
Attorney General of Utah, Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General
of Utah, & Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, for the
State of Utah & others.
Chester Darling & Michael Williams for Massachusetts Citizens Alliance
& another.
Daniel Avila for The Catholic Action League of Massachusetts.
Joshua K. Baker, of California, & Robert G. Caprera for José Martín de
Agar & others.
Wendy J. Herdlein, of California, & James R. Knudsen for the Honorable
Philip Travis & others.
Steven W. Fitschen, of Virginia, for The National Legal Foundation.
Jeffrey A. Shafer & David R. Langdon, of Ohio, William C. Duncan, of
Utah, & Wendy J. Herdlein, of California, for Marriage Law Project.
Lisa Rae, Kenneth Elmore, Arthur Berney, & Josephine Ross for The
Religious Coalition for the Freedom to Marry & others.
Ann DiMaria for The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission & others.
Anthony Mirenda, Vickie L. Henry, Lucy Fowler, John M. Granberry,
Rachel N. Lessem, & Gabriel M. Helmer for Robert F. Williams & others.
Kenneth J. Parsigian for Peter W. Bardaglio & others. David Cruz, of
New York, John Taylor Williams, Carol V. Rose, Debra Squires-Lee,
Christopher Morrison, & Marni Goldstein Caputo for William E. Adams &
others.
Martin J. Newhouse & Katharine Bolland for Coalition gaie et lesbienne
du Québec & others.
Joseph Ureneck, pro se.
Teresa S. Collett, of Texas, & Luke Stanton for Free Market
Foundation.
Peter F. Zupcofska, L. Tracee Whitley, Heidi A. Nadel, & Corin R.
Swift for Boston Bar Association & another.
Mary Jo Johnson, Jonathan A. Shapiro, & Amy L. Nash for The
Massachusetts Psychiatric Society & others.
Tony R. Maida, Nina Joan Kimball, & Justine H. Brousseau for Libby
Adler & others.
Daryl J. Lapp, Kevin D. Batt, & Katharine Silbaugh for Monroe Inker &
another.
David Zwiebel, Mordechai Biser, & Nathan J. Diament, of New York, &
Abba Cohen, of the District of Columbia, for Agudath Israel of America
& others.
Top
MARSHALL, C.J.
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment of
two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it
brings stability to our society. For those who choose to marry, and
for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal,
financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal,
financial, and social obligations. The question before us is whether,
consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may
deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil
marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry. We
conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the
dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of
second-class citizens. In reaching our conclusion we have given full
deference to the arguments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil
marriage to same-sex couples.
We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the history of our
marriage law. Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and
ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of
one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many
hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual
persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual
neighbors. Neither view answers the question before us. Our concern is
with the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for
every person properly within its reach. "Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (Lawrence ), quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
Whether the Commonwealth may use its formidable regulatory authority
to bar same-sex couples from civil marriage is a question not
previously addressed by a Massachusetts appellate court. [FN3] It is a
question the United States Supreme Court left open as a matter of
Federal law in Lawrence, supra at 2484, where it was not an issue.
There, the Court affirmed that the core concept of common human
dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution precludes government intrusion into the deeply personal
realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one's choice of
an intimate partner. The Court also reaffirmed the central role that
decisions whether to marry or have children bear in shaping one's
identity. Id. at 2481. The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything,
more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal
Constitution; it may demand broader protection for fundamental rights;
and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected
spheres of private life.
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one
of our community's most rewarding and cherished institutions. That
exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional principles of
respect for individual autonomy and equality under law.
I
The plaintiffs are fourteen individuals from five Massachusetts
counties. As of April 11, 2001, the date they filed their complaint,
the plaintiffs Gloria Bailey, sixty years old, and Linda Davies,
fifty-five years old, had been in a committed relationship for thirty
years; the plaintiffs Maureen Brodoff, forty-nine years old, and Ellen
Wade, fifty-two years old, had been in a committed relationship for
twenty years and lived with their twelve year old daughter; the
plaintiffs Hillary Goodridge, forty-four years old, and Julie
Goodridge, forty-three years old, had been in a committed relationship
for thirteen years and lived with their five year old daughter; the
plaintiffs Gary Chalmers, thirty-five years old, and Richard Linnell,
thirty-seven years old, had been in a committed relationship for
thirteen years and lived with their eight year old daughter and
Richard's mother; the plaintiffs Heidi Norton, thirty-six years old,
and Gina Smith, thirty-six years old, had been in a committed
relationship for eleven years and lived with their two sons, ages five
years and one year; the plaintiffs Michael Horgan, forty-one years
old, and David Balmelli, forty-one years old, had been in a committed
relationship for seven years; and the plaintiffs David Wilson, fifty-
seven years old, and Robert Compton, fifty-one years old, had been in
a committed relationship for four years and had cared for David's
mother in their home after a serious illness until she died.
The plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment
banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are
active in church, community, and school groups. They have employed
such legal means as are available to them--for example, joint
adoption, powers of attorney, and joint ownership of real property--to
secure aspects of their relationships. Each plaintiff attests a desire
to marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their
commitment to each other and to secure the legal protections and
benefits afforded to married couples and their children.
The Department of Public Health (department) is charged by statute
with safeguarding public health. See G.L. c. 17. Among its
responsibilities, the department oversees the registry of vital
records and statistics (registry), which "enforce[s] all laws"
relative to the issuance of marriage licenses and the keeping of
marriage records, see G.L. c. 17, § 4, and which promulgates policies
and procedures for the issuance of marriage licenses by city and town
clerks and registers. See, e.g., G.L. c. 207, §§ 20, 28A, and 37. The
registry is headed by a registrar of vital records and statistics
(registrar), appointed by the Commissioner of Public Health
(commissioner) with the approval of the public health council and
supervised by the commissioner. See G.L. c. 17, § 4.
In March and April, 2001, each of the plaintiff couples attempted to
obtain a marriage license from a city or town clerk's office. As
required under G.L. c. 207, they completed notices of intention to
marry on forms provided by the registry, see G.L. c. 207, § 20, and
presented these forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk, together
with the required health forms and marriage license fees. See G.L. c.
207, § 19. In each case, the clerk either refused to accept the notice
of intention to marry or denied a marriage license to the couple on
the ground that Massachusetts does not recognize same- sex marriage.
[FN4], [FN5] Because obtaining a marriage license is a necessary
prerequisite to civil marriage in Massachusetts, denying marriage
licenses to the plaintiffs was tantamount to denying them access to
civil marriage itself, with its appurtenant social and legal
protections, benefits, and obligations. [FN6]
On April 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court
against the department and the commissioner seeking a judgment that
"the exclusion of the [p]laintiff couples and other qualified same-sex
couples from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social
status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and
obligations of marriage, violates Massachusetts law." See G.L. c.
231A. The plaintiffs alleged violation of the laws of the
Commonwealth, including but not limited to their rights under arts. 1,
6, 7, 10, 12, and 16, and Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the
Massachusetts Constitution. [FN7], [FN8]
The department, represented by the Attorney General, admitted to a
policy and practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
It denied that its actions violated any law or that the plaintiffs
were entitled to relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment.
A Superior Court judge ruled for the department. In a memorandum of
decision and order dated May 7, 2002, he dismissed the plaintiffs'
claim that the marriage statutes should be construed to permit
marriage between persons of the same sex, holding that the plain
wording of G.L. c. 207, as well as the wording of other marriage
statutes, precluded that interpretation. Turning to the constitutional
claims, he held that the marriage exclusion does not offend the
liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution, and that the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights does not guarantee "the fundamental right to marry a person of
the same sex." He concluded that prohibiting same-sex marriage
rationally furthers the Legislature's legitimate interest in
safeguarding the "primary purpose" of marriage, "procreation." The
Legislature may rationally limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, he
concluded, because those couples are "theoretically ... capable of
procreation," they do not rely on "inherently more cumbersome"
noncoital means of reproduction, and they are more likely than same-
sex couples to have children, or more children.
After the complaint was dismissed and summary judgment entered for the
defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. Both parties requested direct
appellate review, which we granted.
II
Although the plaintiffs refer in passing to "the marriage statutes,"
they focus, quite properly, on G.L. c. 207, the marriage licensing
statute, which controls entry into civil marriage. As a preliminary
matter, we summarize the provisions of that law.
General Laws c. 207 is both a gatekeeping and a public records
statute. It sets minimum qualifications for obtaining a marriage
license and directs city and town clerks, the registrar, and the
department to keep and maintain certain "vital records" of civil
marriages. The gatekeeping provisions of G.L. c. 207 are minimal. They
forbid marriage of individuals within certain degrees of
consanguinity, §§ 1 and 2, and polygamous marriages. See G.L. c. 207,
§ 4. See also G.L. c. 207, § 8 (marriages solemnized in violation of
§§ 1, 2, and 4, are void ab initio). They prohibit marriage if one of
the parties has communicable syphilis, see G.L. c. 207, § 28A, and
restrict the circumstances in which a person under eighteen years of
age may marry. See G.L. c. 207, §§ 7, 25, and 27. The statute requires
that civil marriage be solemnized only by those so authorized. See
G.L. c. 207, §§ 38-40.
The record-keeping provisions of G.L. c. 207 are more extensive.
Marriage applicants file standard information forms and a medical
certificate in any Massachusetts city or town clerk's office and
tender a filing fee. G.L. c. 207, §§ 19-20, 28A. The clerk issues the
marriage license, and when the marriage is solemnized, the individual
authorized to solemnize the marriage adds additional information to
the form and returns it (or a copy) to the clerk's office. G.L. c.
207, §§ 28, 30, 38-40 (this completed form is commonly known as the
"marriage certificate"). The clerk sends a copy of the information to
the registrar, and that information becomes a public record. See G.L.
c. 17, § 4; G.L. c. 66, § 10. [FN9], [FN10]
In short, for all the joy and solemnity that normally attend a
marriage, G.L. c. 207, governing entrance to marriage, is a licensing
law. The plaintiffs argue that because nothing in that licensing law
specifically prohibits marriages between persons of the same sex, we
may interpret the statute to permit "qualified same sex couples" to
obtain marriage licenses, thereby avoiding the question whether the
law is constitutional. See School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield
Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 79 (1982), and cases cited. This claim
lacks merit.
We interpret statutes to carry out the Legislature's intent,
determined by the words of a statute interpreted according to "the
ordinary and approved usage of the language." Hanlon v. Rollins, 286
Mass. 444, 447 (1934). The everyday meaning of "marriage" is "[t]he
legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife," Black's Law
Dictionary 986 (7th ed.1999), and the plaintiffs do not argue that the
term "marriage" has ever had a different meaning under Massachusetts
law. See, e.g., Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810) (marriage
"is an engagement, by which a single man and a single woman, of
sufficient discretion, take each other for husband and wife"). This
definition of marriage, as both the department and the Superior Court
judge point out, derives from the common law. See Commonwealth v.
Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 535 (1807) (Massachusetts common law derives
from English common law except as otherwise altered by Massachusetts
statutes and Constitution). See also Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass.
458, 462-463 (1873) ("when the statutes are silent, questions of the
validity of marriages are to be determined by the jus gentium, the
common law of nations"); C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law
and Practice § 1.2 (3d ed.2002). Far from being ambiguous, the
undefined word "marriage," as used in G.L. c. 207, confirms the
General Court's intent to hew to the term's common-law and quotidian
meaning concerning the genders of the marriage partners.
The intended scope of G.L. c. 207 is also evident in its consanguinity
provisions. See Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437
Mass. 430, 435 (2002) (statute's various provisions may offer insight
into legislative intent). Sections 1 and 2 of G.L. c. 207 prohibit
marriages between a man and certain female relatives and a woman and
certain male relatives, but are silent as to the consanguinity of
male-male or female-female marriage applicants. See G.L. c. 207, §§ 1-
2. The only reasonable explanation is that the Legislature did not
intend that same-sex couples be licensed to marry. We conclude, as did
the judge, that G.L. c. 207 may not be construed to permit same-sex
couples to marry. [FN11]
III
A
The larger question is whether, as the department claims, government
action that bars same-sex couples from civil marriage constitutes a
legitimate exercise of the State's authority to regulate conduct, or
whether, as the plaintiffs claim, this categorical marriage exclusion
violates the Massachusetts Constitution. We have recognized the long-
standing statutory understanding, derived from the common law, that
"marriage" means the lawful union of a woman and a man. But that
history cannot and does not foreclose the constitutional question.
The plaintiffs' claim that the marriage restriction violates the
Massachusetts Constitution can be analyzed in two ways. Does it offend
the Constitution's guarantees of equality before the law? Or do the
liberty and due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution
secure the plaintiffs' right to marry their chosen partner? In matters
implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the
two constitutional concepts frequently overlap, as they do here. See,
e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (noting convergence
of due process and equal protection principles in cases concerning
parent-child relationships); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 728 (1948)
(analyzing statutory ban on interracial marriage as equal protection
violation concerning regulation of fundamental right). See also
Lawrence, supra at 2482 ("Equality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision
on the latter point advances both interests"); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation in District of Columbia public
schools violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution), decided the same day as Brown v. Board of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of
public schools in the States violates the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Much of what we say concerning one standard
applies to the other.
We begin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply
put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil
marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its
name implies: a wholly secular institution. See Commonwealth v.
Munson, 127 Mass. 459, 460-466 (1879) (noting that "[i]n
Massachusetts, from very early times, the requisites of a valid
marriage have been regulated by statutes of the Colony, Province, and
Commonwealth," and surveying marriage statutes from 1639 through
1834). No religious ceremony has ever been required to validate a
Massachusetts marriage. Id.
In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two
willing spouses and an approving State. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436
Mass. 18, 31 (2002) ("Marriage is not a mere contract between two
parties but a legal status from which certain rights and obligations
arise"); Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 409 (1898) (on marriage, the
parties "assume[ ] new relations to each other and to the State"). See
also French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546 (1935). While only the
parties can mutually assent to marriage, the terms of the marriage--
who may marry and what obligations, benefits, and liabilities attach
to civil marriage--are set by the Commonwealth. Conversely, while only
the parties can agree to end the marriage (absent the death of one of
them or a marriage void ab initio), the Commonwealth defines the exit
terms. See G.L. c. 208.
Civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the police
power. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175 (1983)
(regulation of marriage is properly within the scope of the police
power). "Police power" (now more commonly termed the State's
regulatory authority) is an old-fashioned term for the Commonwealth's
lawmaking authority, as bounded by the liberty and equality guarantees
of the Massachusetts Constitution and its express delegation of power
from the people to their government. In broad terms, it is the
Legislature's power to enact rules to regulate conduct, to the extent
that such laws are "necessary to secure the health, safety, good
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community" (citations
omitted). Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 785 (1960). [FN12]
See Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85 (1851).
Without question, civil marriage enhances the "welfare of the
community." It is a "social institution of the highest importance."
French v. McAnarney, supra. Civil marriage anchors an ordered society
by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is central
to the way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the
orderly distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are
cared for and supported whenever possible from private rather than
public funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic
data.
Marriage also bestows enormous private and social advantages on those
who choose to marry. Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal
commitment to another human being and a highly public celebration of
the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and
family. "It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965). Because it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is
among life's momentous acts of self-definition.
Tangible as well as intangible benefits flow from marriage. The
marriage license grants valuable property rights to those who meet the
entry requirements, and who agree to what might otherwise be a
burdensome degree of government regulation of their activities. [FN13]
See Leduc v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 433, 435 (1995), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 827 (1996) ( "The historical aim of licensure generally is
preservation of public health, safety, and welfare by extending the
public trust only to those with proven qualifications"). The
Legislature has conferred on "each party [in a civil marriage]
substantial rights concerning the assets of the other which unmarried
cohabitants do not have." Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 334 (1998).
See Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 618 (1994) (rejecting claim
for equitable distribution of property where plaintiff cohabited with
but did not marry defendant); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401
Mass. 141, 142 (1987) (government interest in promoting marriage would
be "subverted" by recognition of "a right to recover for loss of
consortium by a person who has not accepted the correlative
responsibilities of marriage"); Davis v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 261, 263
(1977) (unmarried partners not entitled to rights of separate support
or alimony). See generally Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316,
327-328 & nn. 10, 11 (1994).
The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are
enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death. The
department states that "hundreds of statutes" are related to marriage
and to marital benefits. With no attempt to be comprehensive, we note
that some of the statutory benefits conferred by the Legislature on
those who enter into civil marriage include, as to property: joint
Massachusetts income tax filing (G.L. c. 62C, § 6); tenancy by the
entirety (a form of ownership that provides certain protections
against creditors and allows for the automatic descent of property to
the surviving spouse without probate) (G.L. c. 184, § 7); extension of
the benefit of the homestead protection (securing up to $300,000 in
equity from creditors) to one's spouse and children (G.L. c. 188, §
1); automatic rights to inherit the property of a deceased spouse who
does not leave a will (G.L. c. 190, § 1); the rights of elective share
and of dower (which allow surviving spouses certain property rights
where the decedent spouse has not made adequate provision for the
survivor in a will) (G.L. c. 191, § 15, and G.L. c. 189); entitlement
to wages owed to a deceased employee (G.L. c. 149, § 178A [general]
and G.L. c. 149, § 178C [public employees] ); eligibility to continue
certain businesses of a deceased spouse (e.g., G.L. c. 112, § 53
[dentist] ); the right to share the medical policy of one's spouse
(e.g., G.L. c. 175, § 108, Second [a ] [3] [defining an insured's
"dependent" to include one's spouse), see Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass.
31, 43 (1999) [domestic partners of city employees not included within
the term "dependent" as used in G.L. c. 32B, § 2] ); thirty-nine week
continuation of health coverage for the spouse of a person who is laid
off or dies (e.g., G.L. c. 175, § 110G); preferential options under
the Commonwealth's pension system (see G.L. c. 32, § 12[2] ["Joint and
Last Survivor Allowance"] ); preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program, MassHealth (e.g., 130 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 515.012[A] prohibiting placing a lien on long-term care patient's
former home if spouse still lives there); access to veterans' spousal
benefits and preferences (e.g., G.L. c. 115, § 1 [defining
"dependents"] and G.L. c. 31, § 26 [State employment] and § 28
[municipal employees] ); financial protections for spouses of certain
Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, prosecutors,
among others) killed in the performance of duty (e.g., G.L. c. 32, §§
100-103); the equitable division of marital property on divorce (G.L.
c. 208, § 34); temporary and permanent alimony rights (G.L. c. 208, §§
17 and 34); the right to separate support on separation of the parties
that does not result in divorce (G.L. c. 209, § 32); and the right to
bring claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium, and for
funeral and burial expenses and punitive damages resulting from tort
actions (G.L. c. 229, §§ 1 and 2; G.L. c. 228, § 1. See Feliciano v.
Rosemar Silver Co., supra ).
Exclusive marital benefits that are not directly tied to property
rights include the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of
children born to a married couple (G.L. c. 209C, § 6, and G.L. c. 46,
§ 4B); and evidentiary rights, such as the prohibition against spouses
testifying against one another about their private conversations,
applicable in both civil and criminal cases (G.L. c. 233, § 20). Other
statutory benefits of a personal nature available only to married
individuals include qualification for bereavement or medical leave to
care for individuals related by blood or marriage (G.L. c. 149, §
52D); an automatic "family member" preference to make medical
decisions for an incompetent or disabled spouse who does not have a
contrary health care proxy, see Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456, 466
(1999); the application of predictable rules of child custody,
visitation, support, and removal out-of-State when married parents
divorce (e.g., G.L. c. 208, § 19 [temporary custody], § 20 [temporary
support], § 28 [custody and support on judgment of divorce], § 30
[removal from Commonwealth], and § 31 [shared custody plan]; priority
rights to administer the estate of a deceased spouse who dies without
a will, and requirement that surviving spouse must consent to the
appointment of any other person as administrator (G.L. c. 38, § 13
[disposition of body], and G.L. c. 113, § 8 [anatomical gifts] ); and
the right to interment in the lot or tomb owned by one's deceased
spouse (G.L. c. 114, §§ 29-33).
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly
or indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special
legal and economic protections obtained by civil marriage.
Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's strong public policy to abolish
legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in
providing for the support and care of minors, see Department of
Revenue v. Mason M., 439 Mass. 665 (2003); Woodward v. Commissioner of
Social Sec., 435 Mass. 536, 546 (2002), the fact remains that marital
children reap a measure of family stability and economic security
based on their parents' legally privileged status that is largely
inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital children.
Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval that
still attends the status of being a marital child. Others are
material, such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and
Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parentage.
It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its
intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has long been
termed a "civil right." See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival"), quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48,
56 (1810) (referring to "civil rights incident to marriages"). See
also Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 561 (1993) (identifying marriage as
a "civil right[ ]"); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 242 (1999) (Johnson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). The United
States Supreme Court has described the right to marry as "of
fundamental importance for all individuals" and as "part of the
fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
See Loving v. Virginia, supra ("The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). [FN14]
Without the right to marry--or more properly, the right to choose to
marry--one is excluded from the full range of human experience and
denied full protection of the laws for one's "avowed commitment to an
intimate and lasting human relationship." Baker v. State, supra at
229. Because civil marriage is central to the lives of individuals and
the welfare of the community, our laws assiduously protect the
individual's right to marry against undue government incursion. Laws
may not "interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry." Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at 387. See Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal.2d 711, 714 (1948) ("There can be no prohibition of marriage
except for an important social objective and reasonable means").
[FN15]
Unquestionably, the regulatory power of the Commonwealth over civil
marriage is broad, as is the Commonwealth's discretion to award public
benefits. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175 (1983)
(marriage); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 652
(1981) (Medicaid benefits). Individuals who have the choice to marry
each other and nevertheless choose not to may properly be denied the
legal benefits of marriage. See Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 334
(1998); Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 618 (1994); Feliciano v.
Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987). But that same logic
cannot hold for a qualified individual who would marry if she or he
only could.
B
For decades, indeed centuries, in much of this country (including
Massachusetts) no lawful marriage was possible between white and black
Americans. That long history availed not when the Supreme Court of
California held in 1948 that a legislative prohibition against
interracial marriage violated the due process and equality guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 728
(1948), or when, nineteen years later, the United States Supreme Court
also held that a statutory bar to interracial marriage violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). [FN16] As
both Perez and Loving make clear, the right to marry means little if
it does not include the right to marry the person of one's choice,
subject to appropriate government restrictions in the interests of
public health, safety, and welfare. See Perez v. Sharp, supra at 717
("the essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice"). See also Loving v. Virginia, supra
at 12. In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives
individuals of access to an institution of fundamental legal,
personal, and social significance--the institution of marriage--
because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual
orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to
a more fully developed understanding of the invidious quality of the
discrimination. [FN17]
The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than
does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ
essentially the same language. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass.,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 424 Mass. 586, 590 (1997); Corning Glass Works
v. Ann & Hope, Inc. of Danvers, 363 Mass. 409, 416 (1973). That the
Massachusetts Constitution is in some instances more protective of
individual liberty interests than is the Federal Constitution is not
surprising. Fundamental to the vigor of our Federal system of
government is that "state courts are absolutely free to interpret
state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to
individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States
Constitution." Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). [FN18]
The individual liberty and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts
Constitution protect both "freedom from" unwarranted government
intrusion into protected spheres of life and "freedom to" partake in
benefits created by the State for the common good. See Bachrach v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 382 Mass. 268, 273 (1981); Dalli v.
Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 759 (1971). Both freedoms are involved
here. Whether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and
whether and how to establish a family--these are among the most basic
of every individual's liberty and due process rights. See, e.g.,
Lawrence, supra at 2481; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
384 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, supra. And
central to personal freedom and security is the assurance that the
laws will apply equally to persons in similar situations. "Absolute
equality before the law is a fundamental principle of our own
Constitution." Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 619 (1912). The
liberty interest in choosing whether and whom to marry would be hollow
if the Commonwealth could, without sufficient justification, foreclose
an individual from freely choosing the person with whom to share an
exclusive commitment in the unique institution of civil marriage.
The Massachusetts Constitution requires, at a minimum, that the
exercise of the State's regulatory authority not be "arbitrary or
capricious." Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 542
(1974). [FN19] Under both the equality and liberty guarantees,
regulatory authority must, at very least, serve "a legitimate purpose
in a rational way"; a statute must "bear a reasonable relation to a
permissible legislative objective." Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor
Vehicles, 413 Mass. 265, 270 (1992). See, e.g., Massachusetts Fed'n of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 778 (2002) (equal
protection); Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348
Mass. 414, 422 (1965) (due process). Any law failing to satisfy the
basic standards of rationality is void.
The plaintiffs challenge the marriage statute on both equal protection
and due process grounds. With respect to each such claim, we must
first determine the appropriate standard of review. Where a statute
implicates a fundamental right or uses a suspect classification, we
employ "strict judicial scrutiny." Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663,
666 (1980). For all other statutes, we employ the " 'rational basis'
test." English v. New England Med. Ctr., 405 Mass. 423, 428 (1989).
For due process claims, rational basis analysis requires that statutes
"bear[ ] a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or some other phase of the general welfare." Coffee-Rich, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, supra, quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418
(1940). For equal protection challenges, the rational basis test
requires that "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends
the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." English v. New
England Med. Ctr., supra at 429, quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). [FN20]
The department argues that no fundamental right or "suspect" class is
at issue here, [FN21] and rational basis is the appropriate standard
of review. For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the
marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due
process or equal protection. Because the statute does not survive
rational basis review, we do not consider the plaintiffs' arguments
that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.
The department posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting
same-sex couples from marrying: (1) providing a "favorable setting for
procreation"; (2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing,
which the department defines as "a two-parent family with one parent
of each sex"; and (3) preserving scarce State and private financial
resources. We consider each in turn.
The judge in the Superior Court endorsed the first rationale, holding
that "the state's interest in regulating marriage is based on the
traditional concept that marriage's primary purpose is procreation."
This is incorrect. Our laws of civil marriage do not privilege
procreative heterosexual intercourse between married people above
every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a
family. General Laws c. 207 contains no requirement that the
applicants for a marriage license attest to their ability or intention
to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a condition of
marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. People who have never
consummated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and stay
married. See Franklin v. Franklin, 154 Mass. 515, 516 (1891) ("The
consummation of a marriage by coition is not necessary to its
validity"). [FN22] People who cannot stir from their deathbed may
marry. See G.L. c. 207, § 28A. While it is certainly true that many,
perhaps most, married couples have children together (assisted or
unassisted), it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the
marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that
is the sine qua non of civil marriage. [FN23]
Moreover, the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children
into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is married or
unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into a family, whether
assistive technology was used to conceive the child, and whether the
parent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual. [FN24]
If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our
statutes would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of
nonmarital child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital
means. The attempt to isolate procreation as "the source of a
fundamental right to marry," post at (Cordy, J., dissenting),
overlooks the integrated way in which courts have examined the complex
and overlapping realms of personal autonomy, marriage, family life,
and child rearing. Our jurisprudence recognizes that, in these nuanced
and fundamentally private areas of life, such a narrow focus is
inappropriate.
The "marriage is procreation" argument singles out the one
unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and
transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage. Like
"Amendment 2" to the Constitution of Colorado, which effectively
denied homosexual persons equality under the law and full access to
the political process, the marriage restriction impermissibly
"identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). In so
doing, the State's action confers an official stamp of approval on the
destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy
of respect. [FN25]
The department's first stated rationale, equating marriage with
unassisted heterosexual procreation, shades imperceptibly into its
second: that confining marriage to opposite-sex couples ensures that
children are raised in the "optimal" setting. Protecting the welfare
of children is a paramount State policy. Restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples, however, cannot plausibly further this policy.
"The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family. The composition of families
varies greatly from household to household." Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 63 (2000). Massachusetts has responded supportively to "the
changing realities of the American family," id. at 64, and has moved
vigorously to strengthen the modern family in its many variations.
See, e.g., G.L. c. 209C (paternity statute); G.L. c. 119, § 39D
(grandparent visitation statute); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (same); E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,
429 Mass. 824, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (de facto parent);
Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 782 (1999) (same); and Adoption of
Tammy, 416 Mass. 205 (1993) (coparent adoption). Moreover, we have
repudiated the common-law power of the State to provide varying levels
of protection to children based on the circumstances of birth. See
G.L. c. 209C (paternity statute); Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650,
661 (1987) ("Ours is an era in which logic and compassion have
impelled the law toward unburdening children from the stigma and the
disadvantages heretofore attendant upon the status of illegitimacy").
The "best interests of the child" standard does not turn on a parent's
sexual orientation or marital status. See e.g., Doe v. Doe, 16
Mass.App.Ct. 499, 503 (1983) (parent's sexual orientation insufficient
ground to deny custody of child in divorce action). See also E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., supra at 829-830 (best interests of child determined by
considering child's relationship with biological and de facto same-sex
parents); Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 339, 341 & n. 3 (1980)
(collecting support and custody statutes containing no gender
distinction).
The department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to
people of the same sex will increase the number of couples choosing to
enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise children.
There is thus no rational relationship between the marriage statute
and the Commonwealth's proffered goal of protecting the "optimal"
child rearing unit. Moreover, the department readily concedes that
people in same-sex couples may be "excellent" parents. These couples
(including four of the plaintiff couples) have children for the
reasons others do--to love them, to care for them, to nurture them.
But the task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made infinitely
harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws. While
establishing the parentage of children as soon as possible is crucial
to the safety and welfare of children, see Culliton v. Beth Israel
Deaconness Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 292 (2001), same-sex couples must
undergo the sometimes lengthy and intrusive process of second-parent
adoption to establish their joint parentage. While the enhanced income
provided by marital benefits is an important source of security and
stability for married couples and their children, those benefits are
denied to families headed by same-sex couples. See, e.g., note 6,
supra. While the laws of divorce provide clear and reasonably
predictable guidelines for child support, child custody, and property
division on dissolution of a marriage, same-sex couples who dissolve
their relationships find themselves and their children in the highly
unpredictable terrain of equity jurisdiction. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,
supra. Given the wide range of public benefits reserved only for
married couples, we do not credit the department's contention that the
absence of access to civil marriage amounts to little more than an
inconvenience to same-sex couples and their children. Excluding same-
sex couples from civil marriage will not make children of opposite-sex
marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of same-sex
couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the
assurance of "a stable family structure in which children will be
reared, educated, and socialized." Post at (Cordy, J., dissenting).
[FN26]
No one disputes that the plaintiff couples are families, that many are
parents, and that the children they are raising, like all children,
need and should have the fullest opportunity to grow up in a secure,
protected family unit. Similarly, no one disputes that, under the
rubric of marriage, the State provides a cornucopia of substantial
benefits to married parents and their children. The preferential
treatment of civil marriage reflects the Legislature's conclusion that
marriage "is the foremost setting for the education and socialization
of children" precisely because it "encourages parents to remain
committed to each other and to their children as they grow." Post at
(Cordy, J., dissenting).
In this case, we are confronted with an entire, sizeable class of
parents raising children who have absolutely no access to civil
marriage and its protections because they are forbidden from procuring
a marriage license. It cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed
it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of State
benefits because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual
orientation.
The third rationale advanced by the department is that limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers the Legislature's interest
in conserving scarce State and private financial resources. The
marriage restriction is rational, it argues, because the General Court
logically could assume that same-sex couples are more financially
independent than married couples and thus less needy of public marital
benefits, such as tax advantages, or private marital benefits, such as
employer-financed health plans that include spouses in their coverage.
An absolute statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational
relationship to the goal of economy. First, the department's
conclusory generalization-- that same-sex couples are less financially
dependent on each other than opposite-sex couples--ignores that many
same-sex couples, such as many of the plaintiffs in this case, have
children and other dependents (here, aged parents) in their care.
[FN27] The department does not contend, nor could it, that these
dependents are less needy or deserving than the dependents of married
couples. Second, Massachusetts marriage laws do not condition receipt
of public and private financial benefits to married individuals on a
demonstration of financial dependence on each other; the benefits are
available to married couples regardless of whether they mingle their
finances or actually depend on each other for support.
The department suggests additional rationales for prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying, which are developed by some amici. It argues
that broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples will
trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage as it has
historically been fashioned. Certainly our decision today marks a
significant change in the definition of marriage as it has been
inherited from the common law, and understood by many societies for
centuries. But it does not disturb the fundamental value of marriage
in our society.
Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the
institution of civil marriage. They do not want marriage abolished.
They do not attack the binary nature of marriage, the consanguinity
provisions, or any of the other gate-keeping provisions of the
marriage licensing law. Recognizing the right of an individual to
marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or
dignity of opposite-sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right
of an individual to marry a person of a different race devalues the
marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race. [FN28] If
anything, extending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the
importance of marriage to individuals and communities. That same-sex
couples are willing to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of
exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a
testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the
human spirit. [FN29]
It has been argued that, due to the State's strong interest in the
institution of marriage as a stabilizing social structure, only the
Legislature can control and define its boundaries. Accordingly, our
elected representatives legitimately may choose to exclude same-sex
couples from civil marriage in order to assure all citizens of the
Commonwealth that (1) the benefits of our marriage laws are available
explicitly to create and support a family setting that is, in the
Legislature's view, optimal for child rearing, and (2) the State does
not endorse gay and lesbian parenthood as the equivalent of being
raised by one's married biological parents. [FN30] These arguments
miss the point. The Massachusetts Constitution requires that
legislation meet certain criteria and not extend beyond certain
limits. It is the function of courts to determine whether these
criteria are met and whether these limits are exceeded. In most
instances, these limits are defined by whether a rational basis exists
to conclude that legislation will bring about a rational result. The
Legislature in the first instance, and the courts in the last
instance, must ascertain whether such a rational basis exists. To
label the court's role as usurping that of the Legislature, see, e.g.,
post at (Cordy, J., dissenting), is to misunderstand the nature and
purpose of judicial review. We owe great deference to the Legislature
to decide social and policy issues, but it is the traditional and
settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues. [FN31]
The history of constitutional law "is the story of the extension of
constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or
excluded." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)
(construing equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit categorical exclusion of women from public military
institute). This statement is as true in the area of civil marriage as
in any other area of civil rights. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Sharp,
32 Cal.2d 711 (1948). As a public institution and a right of
fundamental importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm. The
common law was exceptionally harsh toward women who became wives: a
woman's legal identity all but evaporated into that of her husband.
See generally C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law and
Practice §§ 1.9 and 1.10 (3d ed.2002). Thus, one early Nineteenth
Century jurist could observe matter of factly that, prior to the
abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, "the condition of a slave
resembled the connection of a wife with her husband, and of infant
children with their father. He is obliged to maintain them, and they
cannot be separated from him." Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123,
129 (1808). But since at least the middle of the Nineteenth Century,
both the courts and the Legislature have acted to ameliorate the
harshness of the common-law regime. In Bradford v. Worcester, 184
Mass. 557, 562 (1904), we refused to apply the common-law rule that
the wife's legal residence was that of her husband to defeat her claim
to a municipal "settlement of paupers." In Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 629 (1976), we abrogated the common-law doctrine immunizing a
husband against certain suits because the common-law rule was
predicated on "antediluvian assumptions concerning the role and status
of women in marriage and in society." Id. at 621. Alarms about the
imminent erosion of the "natural" order of marriage were sounded over
the demise of antimiscegenation laws, the expansion of the rights of
married women, and the introduction of "no-fault" divorce. [FN32]
Marriage has survived all of these transformations, and we have no
doubt that marriage will continue to be a vibrant and revered
institution.
We also reject the argument suggested by the department, and
elaborated by some amici, that expanding the institution of civil
marriage in Massachusetts to include same-sex couples will lead to
interstate conflict. We would not presume to dictate how another State
should respond to today's decision. But neither should considerations
of comity prevent us from according Massachusetts residents the full
measure of protection available under the Massachusetts Constitution.
The genius of our Federal system is that each State's Constitution has
vitality specific to its own traditions, and that, subject to the
minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, each State is free
to address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its
own Constitution demands.
Several amici suggest that prohibiting marriage by same-sex couples
reflects community consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral. Yet
Massachusetts has a strong affirmative policy of preventing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See G.L. c. 151B
(employment, housing, credit, services); G.L. c. 265, § 39 (hate
crimes); G.L. c. 272, § 98 (public accommodation); G.L. c. 76, § 5
(public education). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366
Mass. 298 (1974) (decriminalization of private consensual adult
conduct); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 499, 503 (1983) (custody to
homosexual parent not per se prohibited).
The department has had more than ample opportunity to articulate a
constitutionally adequate justification for limiting civil marriage to
opposite-sex unions. It has failed to do so. The department has
offered purported justifications for the civil marriage restriction
that are starkly at odds with the comprehensive network of vigorous,
gender-neutral laws promoting stable families and the best interests
of children. It has failed to identify any relevant characteristic
that would justify shutting the door to civil marriage to a person who
wishes to marry someone of the same sex.
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real
segment of the community for no rational reason. The absence of any
reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute
disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil
marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or
general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in
persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to
be) homosexual. [FN33] "The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) (construing Fourteenth Amendment). Limiting the protections,
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples
violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under
law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.
IV
We consider next the plaintiffs' request for relief. We preserve as
much of the statute as may be preserved in the face of the successful
constitutional challenge. See Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver
Gen., 384 Mass. 718, 725 (1981); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass.
753, 759 (1971). See also G.L. c. 4, § 6, Eleventh.
Here, no one argues that striking down the marriage laws is an
appropriate form of relief. Eliminating civil marriage would be wholly
inconsistent with the Legislature's deep commitment to fostering
stable families and would dismantle a vital organizing principle of
our society. [FN34] We face a problem similar to one that recently
confronted the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the highest court of that
Canadian province, when it considered the constitutionality of the
same-sex marriage ban under Canada's Federal Constitution, the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). See Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172
O.A.C. 276 (2003). Canada, like the United States, adopted the common
law of England that civil marriage is "the voluntary union for life of
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at,
quoting Hyde v. Hyde, [1861-1873] All E.R. 175 (1866). In holding that
the limitation of civil marriage to opposite- sex couples violated the
Charter, the Court of Appeal refined the common-law meaning of
marriage. We concur with this remedy, which is entirely consonant with
established principles of jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a
common-law principle in light of evolving constitutional standards.
See Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650, 661-662 (1987) (reforming the
common-law rule of construction of "issue"); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 629 (1976) (abolishing common-law rule of certain interspousal
immunity).
Top
We construe civil marriage to
mean the voluntary union of two persons
as spouses, to the exclusion of all others. This reformulation
redresses the plaintiffs' constitutional injury and furthers the aim
of marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships. It advances
the two legitimate State interests the department has identified:
providing a stable setting for child rearing and conserving State
resources. It leaves intact the Legislature's broad discretion to
regulate marriage. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175
(1983).
In their complaint the plaintiffs request only a declaration that
their exclusion and the exclusion of other qualified same-sex couples
from access to civil marriage violates Massachusetts law. We declare
that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution. We
vacate the summary judgment for the department. We remand this case to
the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
Entry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the
Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of
this opinion. See, e.g., Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 390 Mass.
523, 535-536 (1983).
So ordered.
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GREANEY, J. (concurring).
I agree with the result reached by the court, the remedy ordered, and
much of the reasoning in the court's opinion. In my view, however, the
case is more directly resolved using traditional equal protection
analysis.
(a) Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, provides:
"All people are born free and equal and have certain natural,
essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the
law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed
or national origin."
This provision, even prior to its amendment, guaranteed to all people
in the Commonwealth--equally--the enjoyment of rights that are deemed
important or fundamental. The withholding of relief from the
plaintiffs, who wish to marry, and are otherwise eligible to marry, on
the ground that the couples are of the same gender, constitutes a
categorical restriction of a fundamental right. The restriction
creates a straightforward case of discrimination that disqualifies an
entire group of our citizens and their families from participation in
an institution of paramount legal and social importance. This is
impermissible under art. 1.
Analysis begins with the indisputable premise that the deprivation
suffered by the plaintiffs is no mere legal inconvenience. The right
to marry is not a privilege conferred by the State, but a fundamental
right that is protected against unwarranted State interference. See
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("the right to marry is
of fundamental importance for all individuals"); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (freedom to marry is "one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"
under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage is one of "basic civil
rights of man"). See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987)
(prisoners' right to marry is constitutionally protected). This right
is essentially vitiated if one is denied the right to marry a person
of one's choice. See Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at 384 (all recent
decisions of United States Supreme Court place "the decision to marry
as among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy").
[FN1]
Because our marriage statutes intend, and state, the ordinary
understanding that marriage under our law consists only of a union
between a man and a woman, they create a statutory classification
based on the sex of the two people who wish to marry. See Baehr v.
Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 564 (1993) (plurality opinion) (Hawaii marriage
statutes created sex-based classification); Baker v. State, 170 Vt.
194, 253 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (same). That the classification is sex based is self- evident.
The marriage statutes prohibit some applicants, such as the
plaintiffs, from obtaining a marriage license, and that prohibition is
based solely on the applicants' gender. As a factual matter, an
individual's choice of marital partner is constrained because of his
or her own sex. Stated in particular terms, Hillary Goodridge cannot
marry Julie Goodridge because she (Hillary) is a woman. Likewise, Gary
Chalmers cannot marry Richard Linnell because he (Gary) is a man. Only
their gender prevents Hillary and Gary from marrying their chosen
partners under the present law. [FN2]
A classification may be gender based whether or not the challenged
government action apportions benefits or burdens uniformly along
gender lines. This is so because constitutional protections extend to
individuals and not to categories of people. Thus, when an individual
desires to marry, but cannot marry his or her chosen partner because
of the traditional opposite-sex restriction, a violation of art. 1 has
occurred. See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 237-238 (2001)
(assuming statute enforceable only across gender lines may offend
Massachusetts equal rights amendment). I find it disingenuous, at
best, to suggest that such an individual's right to marry has not been
burdened at all, because he or she remains free to chose another
partner, who is of the opposite sex.
The equal protection infirmity at work here is strikingly similar to
(although, perhaps, more subtle than) the invidious discrimination
perpetuated by Virginia's antimiscegenation laws and unveiled in the
decision of Loving v. Virginia, supra. In its landmark decision
striking down Virginia's ban on marriages between Caucasians and
members of any other race on both equal protection and substantive due
process grounds, the United States Supreme Court soundly rejected the
proposition that the equal application of the ban (i.e., that it
applied equally to whites and blacks) made unnecessary the strict
scrutiny analysis traditionally required of statutes drawing
classifications according to race, see id. at 8-9, and concluded that
"restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 12. That our marriage laws, unlike antimiscegenation
laws, were not enacted purposely to discriminate in no way neutralizes
their present discriminatory character.
With these two propositions established (the infringement on a
fundamental right and a sex-based classification), the enforcement of
the marriage statutes as they are currently understood is forbidden by
our Constitution unless the State can present a compelling purpose
further by the statutes that can be accomplished in no other
reasonable manner. [FN3] See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 655-656
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003); Lowell v. Kowalski, 380
Mass. 663, 667-669 (1980). This the State has not done. The
justifications put forth by the State to sustain the statute's
exclusion of the plaintiffs are insufficient for the reasons explained
by the court to which I add the following observations.
The rights of couples to have children, to adopt, and to be foster
parents, regardless of sexual orientation and marital status, are
firmly established. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 829, cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999); Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 210-
211 (1993). As recognized in the court's opinion, and demonstrated by
the record in this case, however, the State's refusal to accord legal
recognition to unions of same-sex couples has had the effect of
creating a system in which children of same-sex couples are unable to
partake of legal protections and social benefits taken for granted by
children in families whose parents are of the opposite sex. The
continued maintenance of this caste-like system is irreconcilable
with, indeed, totally repugnant to, the State's strong interest in the
welfare of all children and its primary focus, in the context of
family law where children are concerned, on "the best interests of the
child." The issue at stake is not one, as might ordinarily be the
case, that can be unilaterally and totally deferred to the wisdom of
the Legislature. "While the State retains wide latitude to decide the
manner in which it will allocate benefits, it may not use criteria
which discriminatorily burden the exercise of a fundamental right."
Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 652 (1981). Nor can
the State's wish to conserve resources be accomplished by invidious
distinctions between classes of citizens. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216-217, 227 (1982). [FN4]
A comment is in order with respect to the insistence of some that
marriage is, as a matter of definition, the legal union of a man and a
woman. To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of
those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to justify the
exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory
and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide. [FN5] This case
calls for a higher level of legal analysis. Precisely, the case
requires that we confront ingrained assumptions with respect to
historically accepted roles of men and women within the institution of
marriage and requires that we reexamine these assumptions in light of
the unequivocal language of art. 1, in order to ensure that the
governmental conduct challenged here conforms to the supreme charter
of our Commonwealth. "A written constitution is the fundamental law
for the government of a sovereign State. It is the final statement of
the rights, privileges and obligations of the citizens and the
ultimate grant of the powers and the conclusive definition of the
limitations of the departments of State and of public officers.... To
its provisions the conduct of all governmental affairs must conform.
From its terms there is no appeal." Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349,
376-377 (1921). I do not doubt the sincerity of deeply held moral or
religious beliefs that make inconceivable to some the notion that any
change in the common-law definition of what constitutes a legal civil
marriage is now, or ever would be, warranted. But, as matter of
constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual
conviction, can justify the perpetuation of a hierarchy in which
couples of the same sex and their families are deemed less worthy of
social and legal recognition than couples of the opposite sex and
their families. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (moral disapproval, with no other valid
State interest, cannot justify law that discriminates against groups
of persons); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992) ( "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code").
(b) I am hopeful that our decision will be accepted by those
thoughtful citizens who believe that same-sex unions should not be
approved by the State. I am not referring here to acceptance in the
sense of grudging acknowledgment of the court's authority to
adjudicate the matter. My hope is more liberating. The plaintiffs are
members of our community, our neighbors, our coworkers, our friends.
As pointed out by the court, their professions include investment
advisor, computer engineer, teacher, therapist, and lawyer. The
plaintiffs volunteer in our schools, worship beside us in our
religious houses, and have children who play with our children, to
mention just a few ordinary daily contacts. We share a common humanity
and participate together in the social contract that is the foundation
of our Commonwealth. Simple principles of decency dictate that we
extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full acceptance,
tolerance, and respect. We should do so because it is the right thing
to do. The union of two people contemplated by G.L. c. 207 "is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Because
of the terms of art. 1, the plaintiffs will no longer be excluded from
that association. [FN6]
Top
SPINA, J. (dissenting, with whom Sosman and Cordy, JJ., join).
What is at stake in this case is not the unequal treatment of
individuals or whether individual rights have been impermissibly
burdened, but the power of the Legislature to effectuate social change
without interference from the courts, pursuant to art. 30 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. [FN1] The power to regulate
marriage lies with the Legislature, not with the judiciary. See
Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175 (1983). Today, the court
has transformed its role as protector of individual rights into the
role of creator of rights, and I respectfully dissent.
1. Equal protection. Although the court did not address the
plaintiffs' gender discrimination claim, G.L. c. 207 does not
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender. [FN2] A claim
of gender discrimination will lie where it is shown that differential
treatment disadvantages one sex over the other. See Attorney Gen. v.
Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 349-352
(1979). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
General Laws c. 207 enumerates certain qualifications for obtaining a
marriage license. It creates no distinction between the sexes, but
applies to men and women in precisely the same way. It does not create
any disadvantage identified with gender as both men and women are
similarly limited to marrying a person of the opposite sex. See
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 15-22 (1977) (law prohibiting
prostitution not discriminatory based on gender because of equal
application to men and women).
Similarly, the marriage statutes do not discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation. As the court correctly recognizes, constitutional
protections are extended to individuals, not couples. Ante n. 15. The
marriage statutes do not disqualify individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation from entering into marriage. All individuals, with certain
exceptions not relevant here, are free to marry. Whether an individual
chooses not to marry because of sexual orientation or any other reason
should be of no concern to the court.
The court concludes, however, that G.L. c. 207 unconstitutionally
discriminates against the individual plaintiffs because it denies them
the "right to marry the person of one's choice" where that person is
of the same sex. Ante at. To reach this result the court relies on
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and transforms "choice"
into the essential element of the institution of marriage. The Loving
case did not use the word "choice" in this manner, and it did not
point to the result that the court reaches today. In Loving, the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited Caucasians from marrying non-Caucasians. It concluded that
the statute was intended to preserve white supremacy and invidiously
discriminated against non-Caucasians because of their race. See id. at
11-12. The "choice" to which the Supreme Court referred was the
"choice to marry," and it concluded that with respect to the
institution of marriage, the State had no compelling interest in
limiting the choice to marry along racial lines. Id. The Supreme Court
did not imply the existence of a right to marry a person of the same
sex. To the same effect is Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711 (1948), on
which the court also relies.
Unlike the Loving and Sharp cases, the Massachusetts Legislature has
erected no barrier to marriage that intentionally discriminates
against anyone. Within the institution of marriage, [FN3] anyone is
free to marry, with certain exceptions that are not challenged. In the
absence of any discriminatory purpose, the State's marriage statutes
do not violate principles of equal protection. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ( "invidious quality of a law claimed
to be ... discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a ...
discriminatory purpose"); Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740,
743 (1986) (for purpose of equal protection analysis, standard of
review under State and Federal Constitutions is identical). See also
Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, supra.
This court should not have invoked even the most deferential standard
of review within equal protection analysis because no individual was
denied access to the institution of marriage.
2. Due process. The marriage statutes do not impermissibly burden a
right protected by our constitutional guarantee of due process
implicit in art. 10 of our Declaration of Rights. There is no
restriction on the right of any plaintiff to enter into marriage. Each
is free to marry a willing person of the opposite sex. Cf. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (fundamental right to marry impermissibly
burdened by statute requiring court approval when subject to child
support order).
Substantive due process protects individual rights against unwarranted
government intrusion. See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673
(1993). The court states, as we have said on many occasions, that the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights may protect a right in ways that
exceed the protection afforded by the Federal Constitution. Ante at.
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (State courts afforded
broader protection of rights than granted by United States
Constitution). However, today the court does not fashion a remedy that
affords greater protection of a right. Instead, using the rubric of
due process it has redefined marriage.
Although art. 10 may afford greater protection of rights than the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, our treatment of due
process challenges adheres to the same standards followed in Federal
due process analysis. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 371
(1999). When analyzing a claim that the State has impermissibly
burdened an individual's fundamental or other right or liberty
interest, "[w]e begin by sketching the contours of the right asserted.
We then inquire whether the challenged restriction burdens that
right." Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 646 (1981).
Where a right deemed "fundamental" is implicated, the challenged
restriction will be upheld only if it is "narrowly tailored to further
a legitimate and compelling governmental interest." Aime v.
Commonwealth, supra at 673. To qualify as "fundamental" the asserted
right must be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition,' [Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ] ... and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.' " Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721
(1997), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)
(right to assisted suicide does not fall within fundamental right to
refuse medical treatment because novel and unsupported by tradition)
(citations omitted). See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass.
357, 367 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom.
Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). Rights that are not
considered fundamental merit due process protection if they have been
irrationally burdened. See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of
Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 777-779 & n. 14 (2002).
Although this court did not state that same-sex marriage is a
fundamental right worthy of strict scrutiny protection, it nonetheless
deemed it a constitutionally protected right by applying rational
basis review. Before applying any level of constitutional analysis
there must be a recognized right at stake. Same-sex marriage, or the
"right to marry the person of one's choice" as the court today defines
that right, does not fall within the fundamental right to marry. Same-
sex marriage is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history," and the
court does not suggest that it is. Except for the occasional isolated
decision in recent years, see, e.g., Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194
(1999), same-sex marriage is not a right, fundamental or otherwise,
recognized in this country. Just one example of the Legislature's
refusal to recognize same-sex marriage can be found in a section of
the legislation amending G.L. c. 151B to prohibit discrimination in
the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation, which states:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to legitimize or
validate a 'homosexual marriage'...." St.1989, c. 516, § 19. In this
Commonwealth and in this country, the roots of the institution of
marriage are deeply set in history as a civil union between a single
man and a single woman. There is no basis for the court to recognize
same-sex marriage as a constitutionally protected right.
3. Remedy. The remedy that the court has fashioned both in the name of
equal protection and due process exceeds the bounds of judicial
restraint mandated by art. 30. The remedy that construes gender
specific language as gender neutral amounts to a statutory revision
that replaces the intent of the Legislature with that of the court.
Article 30 permits the court to apply principles of equal protection
and to modify statutory language only if legislative intent is
preserved. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 238-239
(2001) (judicial rewriting of gender language permissible only when
Legislature intended to include both men and women). See also Lowell
v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 670 (1980). Here, the alteration of the
gender- specific language alters precisely what the Legislature
unambiguously intended to preserve, the marital rights of single men
and women. Such a dramatic change in social institutions must remain
at the behest of the people through the democratic process.
Where the application of equal protection principles do not permit
rewriting a statute in a manner that preserves the intent of the
Legislature, we do not rewrite the statute. In Dalli v. Board of
Educ., 358 Mass. 753 (1971), the court refused to rewrite a statute in
a manner that would include unintended individuals. "To attempt to
interpret this [statute] as including those in the category of the
plaintiff would be to engage in a judicial enlargement of the clear
statutory language beyond the limit of our judicial function. We have
traditionally and consistently declined to trespass on legislative
territory in deference to the time tested wisdom of the separation of
powers as expressed in art. [30] of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of Massachusetts even when it appeared that a highly
desirable and just result might thus be achieved." Id. at 759.
Recently, in Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31 (1999), we refused to
expand health insurance coverage to include domestic partners because
such an expansion was within the province of the Legislature, where
policy affecting family relationships is most appropriate and
frequently considered. Id. at 42-43. Principles of equal protection do
not permit the marriage statutes to be changed in the manner that we
have seen today.
This court has previously exercised the judicial restraint mandated by
art. 30 and declined to extend due process protection to rights not
traditionally coveted, despite recognition of their social importance.
See Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250, 252-253 (1997) (receiving workers'
compensation benefits not fundamental right); Doe v. Superintendent of
Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 129 (1995) (declaring education not
fundamental right); Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of
Human Servs., 414 Mass. 551, 565 (1993) (no fundamental right to
receive mental health services); Matter of Tocci, 413 Mass. 542, 548
n. 4 (1992) (no fundamental right to practice law); Commonwealth v.
Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 542 (1974) (no fundamental right
to pursue one's business). Courts have authority to recognize rights
that are supported by the Constitution and history, but the power to
create novel rights is reserved for the people through the democratic
and legislative processes.
Likewise, the Supreme Court exercises restraint in the application of
substantive due process " 'because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.'
[Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).] By extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,
we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public
debate and legislative action. We must therefore 'exercise the utmost
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,' [id.],
lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court,
Moore [v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ] (plurality
opinion)." Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 720.
The court has extruded a new right from principles of substantive due
process, and in doing so it has distorted the meaning and purpose of
due process. The purpose of substantive due process is to protect
existing rights, not to create new rights. Its aim is to thwart
government intrusion, not invite it. The court asserts that the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights serves to guard against government
intrusion into each individual's sphere of privacy. Ante at.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has called for increased due process
protection when individual privacy and intimacy are threatened by
unnecessary government imposition. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (private nature of sexual behavior implicates
increased due process protection); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (privacy protection extended to procreation decisions within
nonmarital context); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (due
process invoked because of intimate nature of procreation decisions).
These cases, along with the Moe case, focus on the threat to privacy
when government seeks to regulate the most intimate activity behind
bedroom doors. The statute in question does not seek to regulate
intimate activity within an intimate relationship, but merely gives
formal recognition to a particular marriage. The State has respected
the private lives of the plaintiffs, and has done nothing to intrude
in the relationships that each of the plaintiff couples enjoy. Cf.
Lawrence v. Texas, supra at 2484 (case "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter"). Ironically, by extending the
marriage laws to same-sex couples the court has turned substantive due
process on its head and used it to interject government into the
plaintiffs' lives.
Top
SOSMAN, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., join).
In applying the rational basis test to any challenged statutory
scheme, the issue is not whether the Legislature's rationale behind
that scheme is persuasive to us, but only whether it satisfies a
minimal threshold of rationality. Today, rather than apply that test,
the court announces that, because it is persuaded that there are no
differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, the Legislature
has no rational basis for treating them differently with respect to
the granting of marriage licenses. [FN1] Reduced to its essence, the
court's opinion concludes that, because same-sex couples are now
raising children, and withholding the benefits of civil marriage from
their union makes it harder for them to raise those children, the
State must therefore provide the benefits of civil marriage to same-
sex couples just as it does to opposite-sex couples. Of course, many
people are raising children outside the confines of traditional
marriage, and, by definition, those children are being deprived of the
various benefits that would flow if they were being raised in a
household with married parents. That does not mean that the
Legislature must accord the full benefits of marital status on every
household raising children. Rather, the Legislature need only have
some rational basis for concluding that, at present, those alternate
family structures have not yet been conclusively shown to be the
equivalent of the marital family structure that has established itself
as a successful one over a period of centuries. People are of course
at liberty to raise their children in various family structures, as
long as they are not literally harming their children by doing so. See
Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 668-670 (2002) (Sosman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003). That does not mean
that the State is required to provide identical forms of
encouragement, endorsement, and support to all of the infinite variety
of household structures that a free society permits.
Based on our own philosophy of child rearing, and on our observations
of the children being raised by same-sex couples to whom we are
personally close, we may be of the view that what matters to children
is not the gender, or sexual orientation, or even the number of the
adults who raise them, but rather whether those adults provide the
children with a nurturing, stable, safe, consistent, and supportive
environment in which to mature. Same-sex couples can provide their
children with the requisite nurturing, stable, safe, consistent, and
supportive environment in which to mature, just as opposite-sex
couples do. It is therefore understandable that the court might view
the traditional definition of marriage as an unnecessary anachronism,
rooted in historical prejudices that modern society has in large
measure rejected and biological limitations that modern science has
overcome.
It is not, however, our assessment that matters. Conspicuously absent
from the court's opinion today is any acknowledgment that the attempts
at scientific study of the ramifications of raising children in same-
sex couple households are themselves in their infancy and have so far
produced inconclusive and conflicting results. Notwithstanding our
belief that gender and sexual orientation of parents should not matter
to the success of the child rearing venture, studies to date reveal
that there are still some observable differences between children
raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex
couples. See post at--(Cordy, J., dissenting). Interpretation of the
data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the personal
and political beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the
differences identified are positive or negative, and as to the
untested explanations of what might account for those differences.
(This is hardly the first time in history that the ostensible steel of
the scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense heat of
political and religious passions.) Even in the absence of bias or
political agenda behind the various studies of children raised by
same-sex couples, the most neutral and strict application of
scientific principles to this field would be constrained by the
limited period of observation that has been available. Gay and lesbian
couples living together openly, and official recognition of them as
their children's sole parents, comprise a very recent phenomenon, and
the recency of that phenomenon has not yet permitted any study of how
those children fare as adults and at best minimal study of how they
fare during their adolescent years. The Legislature can rationally
view the state of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the critical
question it now faces: Are families headed by same- sex parents
equally successful in rearing children from infancy to adulthood as
families headed by parents of opposite sexes? Our belief that children
raised by same-sex couples should fare the same as children raised in
traditional families is just that: a passionately held but utterly
untested belief. The Legislature is not required to share that belief
but may, as the creator of the institution of civil marriage, wish to
see the proof before making a fundamental alteration to that
institution.
Although ostensibly applying the rational basis test to the civil
marriage statutes, it is abundantly apparent that the court is in fact
applying some undefined stricter standard to assess the
constitutionality of the marriage statutes' exclusion of same-sex
couples. While avoiding any express conclusion as to any of the
proffered routes by which that exclusion would be subjected to a test
of strict scrutiny--infringement of a fundamental right,
discrimination based on gender, or discrimination against gays and
lesbians as a suspect classification--the opinion repeatedly alludes
to those concepts in a prolonged and eloquent prelude before
articulating its view that the exclusion lacks even a rational basis.
See, e.g., ante at (noting that State Constitution is "more protective
of individual liberty and equality," demands "broader protection for
fundamental rights," and is "less tolerant of government intrusion
into the protected spheres of private life" than Federal
Constitution); ante at (describing decision to marry and choice of
marital partner as "among life's momentous acts of self-definition");
ante at-- (repeated references to "right to marry" as "fundamental");
ante at-- (repeated comparisons to statutes prohibiting interracial
marriage, which were predicated on suspect classification of race);
ante at--(characterizing ban on same-sex marriage as "invidious"
discrimination that "deprives individuals of access to an institution
of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance" and again
noting that Massachusetts Constitution "protects matters of personal
liberty against government incursion" more zealously than Federal
Constitution); ante at (characterizing "whom to marry, how to express
sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family" as "among
the most basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights");
ante at ("liberty interest in choosing whether and whom to marry would
be hollow" if Commonwealth could "foreclose an individual from freely
choosing the person" to marry); ante at (opining that in "overlapping
realms of personal autonomy, marriage, family life and child-rearing,"
characterized as "fundamentally private areas of life," court uses
"integrated" analysis instead of "narrow focus"). See also ante at n.
29 (suggesting that prohibition on same-sex marriage "impose[s] limits
on personal beliefs"); ante at n. 31] (suggesting that "total
deference" to Legislature in this case would be equivalent to
"strip[ping]" judiciary "of its constitutional authority to decide
challenges" in such areas as forced sterilization, antimiscegenation
statutes, and abortion, even though all cited examples pertain to
fundamental rights analyzed under strict scrutiny, not under rational
basis test); ante at (civil marriage as "a right of fundamental
importance"); ante at (noting State policy of "preventing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation"); ante at,
(prohibition against same-sex marriage inconsistent with "gender
neutral laws promoting stable families," and "rooted in persistent
prejudices against" homosexuals); ante at (prohibition against same-
sex marriage "violated the basic premises of individual liberty"). In
short, while claiming to apply a mere rational basis test, the court's
opinion works up an enormous head of steam by repeated invocations of
avenues by which to subject the statute to strict scrutiny, apparently
hoping that that head of steam will generate momentum sufficient to
propel the opinion across the yawning chasm of the very deferential
rational basis test.
Shorn of these emotion-laden invocations, the opinion ultimately
opines that the Legislature is acting irrationally when it grants
benefits to a proven successful family structure while denying the
same benefits to a recent, perhaps promising, but essentially untested
alternate family structure. Placed in a more neutral context, the
court would never find any irrationality in such an approach. For
example, if the issue were government subsidies and tax benefits
promoting use of an established technology for energy efficient
heating, the court would find no equal protection or due process
violation in the Legislature's decision not to grant the same benefits
to an inventor or manufacturer of some new, alternative technology who
did not yet have sufficient data to prove that that new technology was
just as good as the established technology. That the early results
from preliminary testing of the new technology might look very
promising, or that the theoretical underpinnings of the new technology
might appear flawless, would not make it irrational for the
Legislature to grant subsidies and tax breaks to the established
technology and deny them to the still unproved newcomer in the field.
While programs that affect families and children register higher on
our emotional scale than programs affecting energy efficiency, our
standards for what is or is not "rational" should not be bent by those
emotional tugs. Where, as here, there is no ground for applying strict
scrutiny, the emotionally compelling nature of the subject matter
should not affect the manner in which we apply the rational basis
test.
Or, to the extent that the court is going to invoke such emotion-laden
and value-laden rhetoric as a means of heightening the degree of
scrutiny to be applied, the same form of rhetoric can be employed to
justify the Legislature's proceeding with extreme caution in this
area. In considering whether the Legislature has a rational reason for
postponing a dramatic change to the definition of marriage, it is
surely pertinent to the inquiry to recognize that this proffered
change affects not just a load-bearing wall of our social structure
but the very cornerstone of that structure. See post at--(Cordy, J.,
dissenting). Before making a fundamental alteration to that
cornerstone, it is eminently rational for the Legislature to require a
high degree of certainty as to the precise consequences of that
alteration, to make sure that it can be done safely, without either
temporary or lasting damage to the structural integrity of the entire
edifice. The court today blithely assumes that there are no such
dangers and that it is safe to proceed (see ante at--, an assumption
that is not supported by anything more than the court's blind faith
that it is so.
More importantly, it is not our confidence in the lack of adverse
consequences that is at issue, or even whether that confidence is
justifiable. The issue is whether it is rational to reserve judgment
on whether this change can be made at this time without damaging the
institution of marriage or adversely affecting the critical role it
has played in our society. Absent consensus on the issue (which
obviously does not exist), or unanimity amongst scientists studying
the issue (which also does not exist), or a more prolonged period of
observation of this new family structure (which has not yet been
possible), it is rational for the Legislature to postpone any
redefinition of marriage that would include same-sex couples until
such time as it is certain that that redefinition will not have
unintended and undesirable social consequences. Through the political
process, the people may decide when the benefits of extending civil
marriage to same-sex couples have been shown to outweigh whatever
risks--be they palpable or ephemeral--are involved. However minimal
the risks of that redefinition of marriage may seem to us from our
vantage point, it is not up to us to decide what risks society must
run, and it is inappropriate for us to abrogate that power to
ourselves merely because we are confident that "it is the right thing
to do." Ante at (Greaney, J., concurring).
As a matter of social history, today's opinion may represent a great
turning point that many will hail as a tremendous step toward a more
just society. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, however,
the case stands as an aberration. To reach the result it does, the
court has tortured the rational basis test beyond recognition. I fully
appreciate the strength of the temptation to find this particular law
unconstitutional--there is much to be said for the argument that
excluding gay and lesbian couples from the benefits of civil marriage
is cruelly unfair and hopelessly outdated; the inability to marry has
a profound impact on the personal lives of committed gay and lesbian
couples (and their children) to whom we are personally close (our
friends, neighbors, family members, classmates, and co-workers); and
our resolution of this issue takes place under the intense glare of
national and international publicity. Speaking metaphorically, these
factors have combined to turn the case before us into a "perfect
storm" of a constitutional question. In my view, however, such factors
make it all the more imperative that we adhere precisely and
scrupulously to the established guideposts of our constitutional
jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that makes the rational basis test an
extremely deferential one that focuses on the rationality, not the
persuasiveness, of the potential justifications for the
classifications in the legislative scheme. I trust that, once this
particular "storm" clears, we will return to the rational basis test
as it has always been understood and applied. Applying that
deferential test in the manner it is customarily applied, the
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from the institution of civil
marriage passes constitutional muster. I respectfully dissent.
Top
CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina and Sosman, JJ., join).
The court's opinion concludes that the Department of Public Health has
failed to identify any "constitutionally adequate reason" for limiting
civil marriage to opposite-sex unions, and that there is no
"reasonable relationship" between a disqualification of same-sex
couples who wish to enter into a civil marriage and the protection of
public health, safety, or general welfare. Consequently, it holds that
the marriage statute cannot withstand scrutiny under the Massachusetts
Constitution. Because I find these conclusions to be unsupportable in
light of the nature of the rights and regulations at issue, the
presumption of constitutional validity and significant deference
afforded to legislative enactments, and the "undesirability of the
judiciary substituting its notions of correct policy for that of a
popularly elected Legislature" responsible for making such policy,
Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 433 (1977), I
respectfully dissent. Although it may be desirable for many reasons to
extend to same-sex couples the benefits and burdens of civil marriage
(and the plaintiffs have made a powerfully reasoned case for that
extension), that decision must be made by the Legislature, not the
court.
If a statute either impairs the exercise of a fundamental right
protected by the due process or liberty provisions of our State
Constitution, or discriminates based on a constitutionally suspect
classification such as sex, it will be subject to strict scrutiny when
its validity is challenged. See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 655-
656, 660-661 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (fundamental
right); Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 666 (1980) (sex-based
classification). If it does neither, a statute "will be upheld if it
is 'rationally related to a legitimate State purpose.' " Hallett v.
Wrentham, 398 Mass. 550, 557 (1986), quoting Paro v. Longwood Hosp.,
373 Mass. 645, 649 (1977). This test, referred to in State and Federal
constitutional jurisprudence as the "rational basis test," [FN1] is
virtually identical in substance and effect to the test applied to a
law promulgated under the State's broad police powers (pursuant to
which the marriage statutes and most other licensing and regulatory
laws are enacted): that is, the law is valid if it is reasonably
related to the protection of public health, safety, or general
welfare. See, e.g., Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395
Mass. 670, 682-683 (1985) (applying rational basis review to question
of State exercise of police power).
The Massachusetts marriage statute does not impair the exercise of a
recognized fundamental right, or discriminate on the basis of sex in
violation of the equal rights amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution. Consequently, it is subject to review only to determine
whether it satisfies the rational basis test. Because a conceivable
rational basis exists upon which the Legislature could conclude that
the marriage statute furthers the legitimate State purpose of
ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social structure for
the bearing and raising of children, it is a valid exercise of the
State's police power.
A. Limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman does not
impair the exercise of a fundamental right. Civil marriage is an
institution created by the State. In Massachusetts, the marriage
statutes are derived from English common law, see Commonwealth v.
Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 534 (1807), and were first enacted in colonial
times. Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass. 459, 460 (1879). They were
enacted to secure public interests and not for religious purposes or
to promote personal interests or aspirations. (See discussion infra
at--). As the court notes in its opinion, the institution of marriage
is "the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife," ante at,
and it has always been so under Massachusetts law, colonial or
otherwise.
The plaintiffs contend that because the right to choose to marry is a
"fundamental" right, the right to marry the person of one's choice,
including a member of the same sex, must also be a "fundamental"
right. While the court stops short of deciding that the right to marry
someone of the same sex is "fundamental" such that strict scrutiny
must be applied to any statute that impairs it, it nevertheless agrees
with the plaintiffs that the right to choose to marry is of
fundamental importance ("among the most basic" of every person's
"liberty and due process rights") and would be "hollow" if an
individual was foreclosed from "freely choosing the person with whom
to share ... the ... institution of civil marriage." Ante at. Hence,
it concludes that a marriage license cannot be denied to an individual
who wishes to marry someone of the same sex. In reaching this result
the court has transmuted the "right" to marry into a right to change
the institution of marriage itself. This feat of reasoning succeeds
only if one accepts the proposition that the definition of the
institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman is merely
"conclusory" (as suggested, ante at [Greaney, J., concurring] ),
rather than the basis on which the "right" to partake in it has been
deemed to be of fundamental importance. In other words, only by
assuming that "marriage" includes the union of two persons of the same
sex does the court conclude that restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples infringes on the "right" of same-sex couples of "marry." [FN2]
The plaintiffs ground their contention that they have a fundamental
right to marry a person of the same sex in a long line of Supreme
Court decisions, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); that discuss the importance of
marriage. In context, all of these decisions and their discussions are
about the "fundamental" nature of the institution of marriage as it
has existed and been understood in this country, not as the court has
redefined it today. Even in that context, its "fundamental" nature is
derivative of the nature of the interests that underlie or are
associated with it. [FN3] An examination of those interests reveals
that they are either not shared by same-sex couples or not implicated
by the marriage statutes.
Supreme Court cases that have described marriage or the right to marry
as "fundamental" have focused primarily on the underlying interest of
every individual in procreation, which, historically, could only
legally occur within the construct of marriage because sexual
intercourse outside of marriage was a criminal act. [FN4] In Skinner
v. Oklahoma, supra, the first case to characterize marriage as a
"fundamental" right, the Supreme Court stated, as its rationale for
striking down a sterilization statute, that "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence of the race." Id. at
541. In concluding that a sterilized individual "is forever deprived
of a basic liberty," id., the Court was obviously referring to
procreation rather than marriage, as this court recognized in Matter
of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 560 (1982). Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia,
supra, in which the United States Supreme Court struck down Virginia's
antimiscegenation statute, the Court implicitly linked marriage with
procreation in describing marriage as "fundamental to our very
existence." Id. at 12. In Zablocki v. Redhail, supra, the Court
expressly linked the right to marry with the right to procreate,
concluding that "if [the plaintiff's] right to procreate means
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only
relationship in which the State ... allows sexual relations legally to
take place." Id. at 386. Once again, in Turner v. Safley, supra,
striking a State regulation that curtailed the right of an inmate to
marry, the Court included among the important attributes of such
marriages the "expectation that [the marriage] ultimately will be
fully consummated." Id. at 96. See Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48,
52 (1810) (purpose of marriage is "to regulate, chasten, and refine,
the intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply [and] preserve ...
the species"). Because same-sex couples are unable to procreate on
their own, any right to marriage they may possess cannot be based on
their interest in procreation, which has been essential to the Supreme
Court's denomination of the right to marry as fundamental.
Supreme Court cases recognizing a right to privacy in intimate
decision-making, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, supra (striking down
statute prohibiting use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (striking down statute criminalizing abortion), have also
focused primarily on sexual relations and the decision whether or not
to procreate, and have refused to recognize an "unlimited right" to
privacy. Id. at 154. Massachusetts courts have been no more willing
than the Federal courts to adopt a "universal[ ]" "privacy doctrine,"
Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass. 63, 67 (1978), or to derive
"controversial 'new' rights from the Constitution." Aime v.
Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674 n. 10 (1993).
What the Griswold Court found "repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship" was the prospect of "allow[ing]
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives." Griswold v. Connecticut,
supra at 485-486. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass.
629, 658 (1981), quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 924
(1978) (finding it "difficult to imagine a clearer case of bodily
intrusion" than being forced to bear a child). When Justice Goldberg
spoke of "marital relations" in the context of finding it "difficult
to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations[hip]," Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 495
(Goldberg, J., concurring), he was obviously referring to sexual
relations. [FN5] Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472
(2003), it was the criminalization of private sexual behavior that the
Court found violative of the petitioners' liberty interest.
In Massachusetts jurisprudence, protected decisions generally have
been limited to those concerning "whether or not to beget or bear a
child," Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 564 (1982) (see Opinion of the
Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 1234-1235 [1996] ["focus of (the Griswold
and Roe cases) and the cases following them has been the intrusion ...
into the especially intimate aspects of a person's life implicated in
procreation and childbearing"] ); how to raise a child, see Care &
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58, 60 (1990); or whether or not
to accept medical treatment, see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742 (1977), none of which is at
issue here. See also Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 301
(1974) (statute punishing unnatural and lascivious acts does not apply
to sexual conduct engaged in by adults in private, in light of
"articulation of the constitutional right of an individual to be free
from government regulation of certain sex related activities").
The marriage statute, which regulates only the act of obtaining a
marriage license, does not implicate privacy in the sense that it has
found constitutional protection under Massachusetts and Federal law.
Cf. Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 14 (1977) (solicitation of
prostitution "while in a place to which the public had access"
implicated no "constitutionally protected rights of privacy"); Marcoux
v. Attorney Gen., supra at 68 (right to privacy, at most, protects
conduct "limited more or less to the hearth"). It does not intrude on
any right that the plaintiffs have to privacy in their choices
regarding procreation, an intimate partner or sexual relations. [FN6]
The plaintiffs' right to privacy in such matters does not require that
the State officially endorse their choices in order for the right to
be constitutionally vindicated.
Although some of the privacy cases also speak in terms of personal
autonomy, no court has ever recognized such an open-ended right. "That
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion
that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected...." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
Such decisions are protected not because they are important, intimate,
and personal, but because the right or liberty at stake is "so deeply
rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept
of constitutionally ordered liberty" that it is protected by due
process. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has concluded that while
the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment is fundamental,
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990),
because it is deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, the
equally personal and profound decision to commit suicide is not
because of the absence of such roots. Washington v. Glucksberg, supra.
While the institution of marriage is deeply rooted in the history and
traditions of our country and our State, the right to marry someone of
the same sex is not. No matter how personal or intimate a decision to
marry someone of the same sex might be, the right to make it is not
guaranteed by the right of personal autonomy.
The protected right to freedom of association, in the sense of freedom
of choice "to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships," Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617
(1984) (as an element of liberty or due process rather than free
speech), is similarly limited and unimpaired by the marriage statute.
As recognized by the Supreme Court, that right affords protection only
to "certain kinds of highly personal relationships," id. at 618, such
as those between husband and wife, parent and child, and among close
relatives, id. at 619, that "have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation," id. at 618-619, and are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-499, 503 (1977) (distinguishing on this
basis between family and nonfamily relationships). Unlike opposite-sex
marriages, which have deep historic roots, or the parent-child
relationship, which reflects a "strong tradition" founded on "the
history and culture of Western civilization" and "is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition," Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); or extended family relationships, which have
been "honored throughout our history," Moore v. East Cleveland, supra
at 505, same-sex relationships, although becoming more accepted, are
certainly not so "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" as to warrant such enhanced constitutional protection.
Although "expressions of emotional support and public commitment" have
been recognized as among the attributes of marriage, which, "[t]aken
together ... form a constitutionally protected marital relationship"
(emphasis added), Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95, 96 (1987), those
interests, standing alone, are not the source of a fundamental right
to marry. While damage to one's "status in the community" may be
sufficient harm to confer standing to sue, Lowell v. Kowalski, 380
Mass. 663, 667 (1980), such status has never been recognized as a
fundamental right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (mere
damage to reputation does not constitute deprivation of "liberty").
Finally, the constitutionally protected interest in child rearing,
recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); and Care &
Protection of Robert, supra at 58, 60, is not implicated or infringed
by the marriage statute here. The fact that the plaintiffs cannot
marry has no bearing on their independently protected constitutional
rights as parents which, as with opposite-sex parents, are limited
only by their continued fitness and the best interests of their
children. Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579 (1980) (courts may
not use parent's sexual orientation as reason to deny child custody).
Because the rights and interests discussed above do not afford the
plaintiffs any fundamental right that would be impaired by a statute
limiting marriage to members of the opposite sex, they have no
fundamental right to be declared "married" by the State.
Insofar as the right to marry someone of the same sex is neither found
in the unique historical context of our Constitution [FN7] nor
compelled by the meaning ascribed by this court to the liberty and due
process protections contained within it, should the court nevertheless
recognize it as a fundamental right? The consequences of deeming a
right to be "fundamental" are profound, and this court, as well as the
Supreme Court, has been very cautious in recognizing them. [FN8] Such
caution is required by separation of powers principles. If a right is
found to be "fundamental," it is, to a great extent, removed from "the
arena of public debate and legislative action"; utmost care must be
taken when breaking new ground in this field "lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of [judges]." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997).
"[T]o rein in" the otherwise potentially unlimited scope of
substantive due process rights, id. at 722, both Federal and
Massachusetts courts have recognized as "fundamental" only those
"rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition,' [Moore v. East Cleveland, supra at
503] ... and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " Id. at
720-721, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See
Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13 (2002) (same). In the area of
family-related rights in particular, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that the "Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted." Moore v. East
Cleveland, supra. [FN9]
Applying this limiting principle, the Supreme Court, as noted above,
declined to recognize a fundamental right to physician-assisted
suicide, which would have required "revers[ing] centuries of legal
doctrine and practice, and strik [ing] down the considered policy
choice of almost every State." Washington v. Glucksberg, supra at 723.
While recognizing that public attitudes toward assisted suicide are
currently the subject of "earnest and profound debate," the Court
nevertheless left the continuation and resolution of that debate to
the political arena, "as it should be in a democratic society." Id. at
719, 735.
Similarly, Massachusetts courts have declined to recognize rights that
are not so deeply rooted. [FN10] As this court noted in considering
whether to recognize a right of terminally ill patients to refuse
life-prolonging treatment, "the law always lags behind the most
advanced thinking in every area," and must await "some common ground,
some consensus." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737 (1977), quoting Burger, The Law and
Medical Advances, 67 Annals Internal Med. Supp. 7, 15, 17 (1967). See
Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 662-663 n. 22 (2002) ("social consensus
about family relationships is relevant to the constitutional limits on
State intervention").
This is not to say that a statute that has no rational basis must
nevertheless be upheld as long as it is of ancient origin. However,
"[t]he long history of a certain practice ... and its acceptance as an
uncontroversial part of our national and State tradition do suggest
that [the court] should reflect carefully before striking it down."
Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 557 (1979). As this
court has recognized, the "fact that a challenged practice 'is
followed by a large number of states ... is plainly worth considering
in determining whether the practice "offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." ' " Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 533
(1976), quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
Although public attitudes toward marriage in general and same-sex
marriage in particular have changed and are still evolving, "the
asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests for
which [plaintiffs] contend" are "manifestly [less] deeply founded"
than the "historic institution" of marriage. Matter of the Estate of
Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 133-134 (N.Y.1993). Indeed, it is not readily
apparent to what extent contemporary values have embraced the concept
of same-sex marriage. Perhaps the "clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country's legislatures," Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312
(2002), quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). No State
Legislature has enacted laws permitting same-sex marriages; and a
large majority of States, as well as the United States Congress, have
affirmatively prohibited the recognition of such marriages for any
purpose. See P. Greenberg, State Laws Affecting Lesbians and Gays,
National Conference of State Legislatures Legisbriefs at 1 (April/May
2001) (reporting that, as of May, 2001, thirty-six States had enacted
"defense of marriage" statutes); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (2000) (Federal Defense of Marriage Act).
Given this history and the current state of public opinion, as
reflected in the actions of the people's elected representatives, it
cannot be said that "a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the
traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to
recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. Neither ... [is] a right to same-sex marriage ...
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed." Baehr v. Lewin, 74
Haw. 530, 556-557 (1993). See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 333 (D.C.1995) (per curiam) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312 (1971),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Storrs v. Holcomb, 168 Misc.2d
898, 899-900 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996), dismissed, 245 A.D.2d 943 (N.Y.1997).
[FN11]. The one exception was the Alaska Superior Court, which relied
on that State's Constitution's express and broadly construed right to
privacy. Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *3-*4. [FN12] In such circumstances,
the law with respect to same- sex marriages must be left to develop
through legislative processes, subject to the constraints of
rationality, lest the court be viewed as using the liberty and due
process clauses as vehicles merely to enforce its own views regarding
better social policies, a role that the strongly worded separation of
powers principles in art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of our
Constitution forbids, and for which the court is particularly ill
suited.
B. The marriage statute, in limiting marriage to heterosexual couples,
does not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of
the Equal Rights Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. In his
concurrence, Justice Greaney contends that the marriage statute
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of art. 1
of the Declaration of Rights as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments
to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). [FN13] Such a conclusion is analytically unsound and
inconsistent with the legislative history of the ERA.
The central purpose of the ERA was to eradicate discrimination against
women and in favor of men or vice versa. See Attorney Gen. v.
Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 357
(1979). Consistent with this purpose, we have construed the ERA to
prohibit laws that advantage one sex at the expense of the other, but
not laws that treat men and women equally, id. at 346-349 (assuming
that "separate but equal" treatment of males and females would be
constitutionally permissible). The Massachusetts marriage statute does
not subject men to different treatment from women; each is equally
prohibited from precisely the same conduct. See Baker v. State, 170
Vt. 194, 215 n. 13 (1999) ("there is no discrete class subject to
differential treatment solely on the basis of sex"). Compare
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 16 (1977) (law prohibiting
prostitution applied to both male and female prostitutes and therefore
did not discriminate), and Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 274-275 (1979) (declining to characterize veterans'
preference as sex discrimination because it applied to both male and
female veterans), with Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, supra, and Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663 (1980)
(where statutes and rules at issue advantaged one sex over another).
Of course, a statute that on its face treats protected groups equally
may still harm, stigmatize, or advantage one over the other. Such was
the circumstance in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the
Supreme Court struck down a State statute that made interracial
marriage a crime, as constituting invidious discrimination on the
basis of race. While the statute purported to apply equally to whites
and nonwhites, the Court found that it was intended and structured to
favor one race (white) and disfavor all others (nonwhites). The
statute's legislative history demonstrated that its purpose was not
merely to punish interracial marriage, but to do so for the sole
benefit of the white race. As the Supreme Court readily concluded, the
Virginia law was "designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id. at 11.
Consequently, there was a fit between the class that the law was
intended to discriminate against (nonwhite races) and the
classification enjoying heightened protection (race).
By contrast, here there is no evidence that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples was motivated by sexism in general or a desire to
disadvantage men or women in particular. Moreover, no one has
identified any harm, burden, disadvantage, or advantage accruing to
either gender as a consequence of the Massachusetts marriage statute.
In the absence of such effect, the statute limiting marriage to
couples of the opposite sex does not violate the ERA's prohibition of
sex discrimination. [FN14]
This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative history of the ERA,
which was adopted by the voters on November 2, 1976, after being
approved by constitutional conventions of the Legislature on August
15, 1973, (by a vote of 261-0) and May 14, 1975 (by a vote of 217-55).
In anticipation of its adoption, the Legislature enacted and, on June
21, 1975, the Governor approved a "Resolve providing for an
investigation and study by a special commission relative to the effect
of the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United
States prohibiting discrimination on account of sex upon the laws,
business communities and public in the Commonwealth." Res.1975, c. 26.
One of the principal tasks of the commission was to catalog the
aspects of the General Laws that would have to be amended for the
statutory code to comply with the mandate of the proposed amendment
that equality not be abridged on the basis of sex. [FN15]
On October 19, 1976, just before the general election at which the
amendment was to be considered, the commission filed its Interim
Report, which focused on the effect of the Massachusetts ERA on the
laws of the Commonwealth. 1976 Senate Doc. No. 1689. A section of the
report, entitled "Areas Unaffected by the Equal Rights Amendment,"
addressed some of the legal regimes that would not be affected by the
adoption of the ERA. One such area was "Homosexual Marriage," about
which the commission stated:
"An equal rights amendment will have no effect upon the allowance or
denial of homosexual marriages. The equal rights amendment is not
concerned with the relationship of two persons of the same sex; it
only addresses those laws or public-related actions which treat
persons of opposite sexes differently. The Washington Court of Appeals
has already stated that the equal rights amendment to its state
constitution did not afford a basis for validating homosexual
marriages. In Colorado, the attorney general has likewise issued an
opinion that the state equal rights amendment did not validate
homosexual marriage. There are no cases which have used a state equal
rights amendment to either validate or require the allowance of
homosexual marriages." (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 21-22. [FN16]
The views of the commission were reflected in the public debate
surrounding the passage of the ERA that focused on gender equality.
See, e.g., Referenda reviewed, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1976, at 26;
Voters' guide on nine state referendum measures, Boston Herald
American, Nov. 1, 1976, at 17. Claims that the ERA might be the basis
for validating marriages between same-sex couples were labelled as
"exaggerated" and "unfounded." For example, before the vote, the
Boston Globe published an editorial discussing and urging favorable
action on the ERA. In making its case, it noted that "[t]hose urging a
no vote ... argue that the amendment would ... legitimize marriage
between people of the same sex [and other changes]. In reality, the
proposed amendment would require none of these things. Mass. ballot
issues ... 1 Equal Rights Amendment. Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1976, at
29. And in the aftermath of the vote, the Boston Globe heralded the
electorate's acceptance of "the arguments of proponents that the
proposal would not result in many far-reaching or threatening
changes." Referendums fared poorly, Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1976, at 29.
While the court, in interpreting a constitutional amendment, is not
bound to accept either the views of a legislative commission studying
and reporting on the amendment's likely effects, or of public
commentary and debate contemporaneous with its passage, it ought to be
wary of completely disregarding what appears to be the clear intent of
the people recently recorded in our constitutional history. This is
particularly so where the plain wording of the amendment does not
require the result it would reach.
C. The marriage statute satisfies the rational basis standard. The
burden of demonstrating that a statute does not satisfy the rational
basis standard rests on the plaintiffs. It is a weighty one. "[A]
reviewing court will presume a statute's validity, and make all
rational inferences in favor of it.... The Legislature is not required
to justify its classifications, nor provide a record or finding in
support of them." (Citation omitted.) Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373
Mass. 645, 650 (1977). The statute "only need[s to] be supported by a
conceivable rational basis." Fine v. Contributory Retirement Appeal
Bd., 401 Mass. 639, 641 (1988). See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v.
Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 771-772 (2002). As this court stated in
Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 687-688 (1981):
"[I]t is not the court's function to launch an inquiry to resolve a
debate which has already been settled in the legislative forum. '[I]t
[is] the judge's duty ... to give effect to the will of the people as
expressed in the statute by their representative body. It is in this
way ... that the doctrine of separation of powers is given meaning.'
Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 202 (1969) (Kirk, J.,
concurring).
"This respect for the legislative process means that it is not the
province of the court to sit and weigh conflicting evidence supporting
or opposing a legislative enactment....
"Although persons challenging the constitutionality of legislation may
introduce evidence in support of their claim that the legislation is
irrational ... they will not prevail if 'the question is at least
debatable' in view of the evidence which may have been available to
the Legislature. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
154 (1938)."
The "time tested wisdom of the separation of powers" requires courts
to avoid "judicial legislation in the guise of new constructions to
meet real or supposed new popular viewpoints, preserving always to the
Legislature alone its proper prerogative of adjusting the statutes to
changed conditions." Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 423 Mass.
534, 539, 540 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1131 (1997), quoting
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 595 (1975).
In analyzing whether a statute satisfies the rational basis standard,
we look to the nature of the classification embodied in the enactment,
then to whether the statute serves a legitimate State purpose, and
finally to whether the classification is reasonably related to the
furtherance of that purpose. With this framework, we turn to the
challenged statute, G.L. c. 207, which authorizes local town officials
to issue licenses to couples of the opposite sex authorizing them to
enter the institution of civil marriage.
1. Classification. The nature of the classification at issue is
readily apparent. Opposite-sex couples can obtain a license and same-
sex couples cannot. The granting of this license, and the completion
of the required solemnization of the marriage, opens the door to many
statutory benefits and imposes numerous responsibilities. The fact
that the statute does not permit such licenses to be issued to couples
of the same sex thus bars them from civil marriage. The classification
is not drawn between men and women or between heterosexuals and
homosexuals, any of whom can obtain a license to marry a member of the
opposite sex; rather, it is drawn between same-sex couples and
opposite-sex couples.
2. State purpose. The court's opinion concedes that the civil marriage
statute serves legitimate State purposes, but further investigation
and elaboration of those purposes is both helpful and necessary.
Civil marriage is the institutional mechanism by which societies have
sanctioned and recognized particular family structures, and the
institution of marriage has existed as one of the fundamental
organizing principles of human society. See C.N. Degler, The Emergence
of the Modern American Family, in The American Family in Social-
Historical Perspective 61 (3d ed.1983); A.J. Hawkins, Introduction, in
Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First Century:
An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage xiv (2002); C. Lasch, Social
Pathologists and the Socialization of Reproduction, in The American
Family in Social-Historical Perspective, supra at 80; W.J. O'Donnell &
D.A. Jones, Marriage and Marital Alternatives 1 (1982); L. Saxton, The
Individual, Marriage, and the Family 229-230, 260 (1968); M.A.
Schwartz & B.M. Scott, Marriages and Families: Diversity and Change 4
(1994); Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 771, 777-780 (2001); J.Q. Wilson, The Marriage
Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Families 28, 40, 66-67 (2002).
Marriage has not been merely a contractual arrangement for legally
defining the private relationship between two individuals (although
that is certainly part of any marriage). Rather, on an institutional
level, marriage is the "very basis of the whole fabric of civilized
society," J.P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and
Divorce, and Evidence in Matrimonial Suits § 32 (1852), and it serves
many important political, economic, social, educational,
procreational, and personal functions.
Paramount among its many important functions, the institution of
marriage has systematically provided for the regulation of
heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and
ensured a stable family structure in which children will be reared,
educated, and socialized. See Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52
(1810) (civil marriage "intended to regulate, chasten, and refine, the
intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply, preserve, and improve
the species"). See also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, American Couples:
Money, Work, Sex 29 (1983); C.N. Degler, supra at 61; G. Douglas,
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Parenthood--From Contract to Status?, in
Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England
223 (2000); S.L. Nock, The Social Costs of De-Institutionalizing
Marriage, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-
First Century: An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage, supra at 7; L.
Saxton, supra at 239- 240, 242; M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at
4-6; Wardle, supra at 781-796; J.Q. Wilson, supra at 23-32.
Admittedly, heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are
not necessarily conjoined (particularly in the modern age of
widespread effective contraception and supportive social welfare
programs), but an orderly society requires some mechanism for coping
with the fact that sexual intercourse commonly results in pregnancy
and childbirth. The institution of marriage is that mechanism.
The institution of marriage provides the important legal and normative
link between heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand
and family responsibilities on the other. The partners in a marriage
are expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations, with children
the probable result and paternity presumed. See G.L. c. 209C, § 6 ("a
man is presumed to be the father of a child ... if he is or has been
married to the mother and the child was born during the marriage, or
within three hundred days after the marriage was terminated by death,
annulment or divorce"). Whereas the relationship between mother and
child is demonstratively and predictably created and recognizable
through the biological process of pregnancy and childbirth, there is
no corresponding process for creating a relationship between father
and child. [FN17] Similarly, aside from an act of heterosexual
intercourse nine months prior to childbirth, there is no process for
creating a relationship between a man and a woman as the parents of a
particular child. The institution of marriage fills this void by
formally binding the husband-father to his wife and child, and
imposing on him the responsibilities of fatherhood. See J.Q. Wilson,
supra at 23-32. See also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, supra at 29; C.N.
Degler, supra at 61; G. Douglas, supra at 223; S.L. Nock, supra at 7;
L. Saxton, supra at 239-240, 242; M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at
4-6; Wardle, supra at 781-796. The alternative, a society without the
institution of marriage, in which heterosexual intercourse,
procreation, and child care are largely disconnected processes, would
be chaotic.
The marital family is also the foremost setting for the education and
socialization of children. Children learn about the world and their
place in it primarily from those who raise them, and those children
eventually grow up to exert some influence, great or small, positive
or negative, on society. The institution of marriage encourages
parents to remain committed to each other and to their children as
they grow, thereby encouraging a stable venue for the education and
socialization of children. See P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, supra at
26; C.N. Degler, supra at 61; S.L. Nock, supra at 2-3; C. Lasch, supra
at 81; M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at 6-7. More macroscopically,
construction of a family through marriage also formalizes the bonds
between people in an ordered and institutional manner, thereby
facilitating a foundation of interconnectedness and interdependency on
which more intricate stabilizing social structures might be built. See
M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth-
Century America 10 (1985); C. Lasch, supra; L. Saxton, supra at 260;
J.Q. Wilson, supra at 221.
This court, among others, has consistently acknowledged both the
institutional importance of marriage as an organizing principle of
society, and the State's interest in regulating it. See French v.
McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546 (1935) ("Marriage is not merely a
contract between the parties. It is the foundation of the family. It
is a social institution of the highest importance. The Commonwealth
has a deep interest that its integrity is not jeopardized"); Milford
v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810) ("Marriage, being essential to the
peace and harmony, and to the virtues and improvements of civil
society, it has been, in all well-regulated governments, among the
first attentions of the civil magistrate to regulate [it]"). See also
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
[human] race"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (marriage
"is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress"); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) ("no legislation
can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a
free, self-governing commonwealth ... than that which seeks to
establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in
and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman ... the
sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization;
the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all
beneficent progress in social and political improvement"); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) ("Upon [marriage] society may
be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and
social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal").
It is undeniably true that dramatic historical shifts in our cultural,
political, and economic landscape have altered some of our traditional
notions about marriage, including the interpersonal dynamics within
it, [FN18] the range of responsibilities required of it as an
institution, [FN19] and the legal environment in which it exists.
[FN20] Nevertheless, the institution of marriage remains the principal
weave of our social fabric. See C.N. Degler, supra at 61; A.J.
Hawkins, Introduction, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for
the Twenty-First Century: An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage xiv
(2002); C. Lasch, supra at 80; W.J. O'Donnell & D.A. Jones, Marriage
and Marital Alternatives 1 (1982); L. Saxton, supra at 229-230, 260;
M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at 4; Wardle, supra at 777-780; J.Q.
Wilson, supra at 28, 40, 66-67. A family defined by heterosexual
marriage continues to be the most prevalent social structure into
which the vast majority of children are born, nurtured, and prepared
for productive participation in civil society, see Children's Living
Arrangements and Characteristics: March, 2002, United States Census
Bureau Current Population Reports at 3 (June, 2003) (in 2002, 69% of
children lived with two married parents, 23% lived with their mother,
5% lived with their father, and 4% lived in households with neither
parent present).
It is difficult to imagine a State purpose more important and
legitimate than ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social
structure within which to bear and raise children. At the very least,
the marriage statute continues to serve this important State purpose.
[FN21]
3. Rational relationship. The question we must turn to next is whether
the statute, construed as limiting marriage to couples of the opposite
sex, remains a rational way to further that purpose. Stated
differently, we ask whether a conceivable rational basis exists on
which the Legislature could conclude that continuing to limit the
institution of civil marriage to members of the opposite sex furthers
the legitimate purpose of ensuring, promoting, and supporting an
optimal social structure for the bearing and raising of children.
[FN22]
In considering whether such a rational basis exists, we defer to the
decision- making process of the Legislature, and must make deferential
assumptions about the information that it might consider and on which
it may rely. See Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 688 (1981)
(court considers "evidence which may have been available to the
Legislature" [emphasis added] ); Slome v. Chief of Police of
Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187, 189 (1939) ("any rational basis of fact that
can be reasonably conceived" may support legislative finding); Mutual
Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 487 (1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 225
(1911) ("Legislature may be supposed to have known" relevant facts).
We must assume that the Legislature (1) might conclude that the
institution of civil marriage has successfully and continually
provided this structure over several centuries [FN23]; (2) might
consider and credit studies that document negative consequences that
too often follow children either born outside of marriage or raised in
households lacking either a father or a mother figure, [FN24] and
scholarly commentary contending that children and families develop
best when mothers and fathers are partners in their parenting [FN25];
and (3) would be familiar with many recent studies that variously:
support the proposition that children raised in intact families headed
by same-sex couples fare as well on many measures as children raised
in similar families headed by opposite-sex couples [FN26]; support the
proposition that children of same-sex couples fare worse on some
measures [FN27]; or reveal notable differences between the two groups
of children that warrant further study. [FN28]
We must also assume that the Legislature would be aware of the
critiques of the methodologies used in virtually all of the
comparative studies of children raised in these different
environments, cautioning that the sampling populations are not
representative, that the observation periods are too limited in time,
[FN29] that the empirical data are unreliable, and that the hypotheses
are too infused with political or agenda driven bias. See, e.g., R.
Lerner & A.K. Nagai, No Basis: What the Studies Don't Tell Us About
Same-Sex Parenting, Marriage Law Project (Jan.2001) (criticizing
forty-nine studies on same-sex parenting -- at least twenty-six of
which were cited by amici in this case--as suffering from flaws in
formulation of hypotheses, use of experimental controls, use of
measurements, sampling and statistical testing, and finding false
negatives); Stacey, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 159, 159-166 (2001) (highlighting problems
with sampling pools, lack of longitudinal studies, and political
hypotheses).
Taking all of this available information into account, the Legislature
could rationally conclude that a family environment with married
opposite-sex parents remains the optimal social structure in which to
bear children, and that the raising of children by same-sex couples,
who by definition cannot be the two sole biological parents of a child
and cannot provide children with a parental authority figure of each
gender, [FN30] presents an alternative structure for child rearing
that has not yet proved itself beyond reasonable scientific dispute to
be as optimal as the biologically based marriage norm. See Baker v.
State, 170 Vt. 194, 222 (1999) ("conceivable that the Legislature
could conclude that opposite-sex partners offer advantages in th[e]
area [of child rearing], although ... experts disagree and the answer
is decidedly uncertain"). Cf. Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass. 63,
65 (1978). Working from the assumption that a recognition of same-sex
marriages will increase the number of children experiencing this
alternative, the Legislature could conceivably conclude that declining
to recognize same-sex marriages remains prudent until empirical
questions about its impact on the upbringing of children are resolved.
[FN31]
The fact that the Commonwealth currently allows same-sex couples to
adopt, see Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205 (1993), does not affect
the rationality of this conclusion. The eligibility of a child for
adoption presupposes that at least one of the child's biological
parents is unable or unwilling, for some reason, to participate in
raising the child. In that sense, society has "lost" the optimal
setting in which to raise that child--it is simply not available. In
these circumstances, the principal and overriding consideration is the
"best interests of the child," considering his or her unique
circumstances and the options that are available for that child. The
objective is an individualized determination of the best environment
for a particular child, where the normative social structure--a home
with both the child's biological father and mother--is not an option.
That such a focused determination may lead to the approval of a same-
sex couple's adoption of a child does not mean that it would be
irrational for a legislator, in fashioning statutory laws that cannot
make such individualized determinations, to conclude generally that
being raised by a same-sex couple has not yet been shown to be the
absolute equivalent of being raised by one's married biological
parents.
That the State does not preclude different types of families from
raising children does not mean that it must view them all as equally
optimal and equally deserving of State endorsement and support. [FN32]
For example, single persons are allowed to adopt children, but the
fact that the Legislature permits single-parent adoption does not mean
that it has endorsed single parenthood as an optimal setting in which
to raise children or views it as the equivalent of being raised by
both of one's biological parents. [FN33] The same holds true with
respect to same-sex couples--the fact that they may adopt children
means only that the Legislature has concluded that they may provide an
acceptable setting in which to raise children who cannot be raised by
both of their biological parents. The Legislature may rationally
permit adoption by same-sex couples yet harbor reservations as to
whether parenthood by same-sex couples should be affirmatively
encouraged to the same extent as parenthood by the heterosexual couple
whose union produced the child. [FN34]
In addition, the Legislature could conclude that redefining the
institution of marriage to permit same-sex couples to marry would
impair the State's interest in promoting and supporting heterosexual
marriage as the social institution that it has determined best
normalizes, stabilizes, and links the acts of procreation and child
rearing. While the plaintiffs argue that they only want to take part
in the same stabilizing institution, the Legislature conceivably could
conclude that permitting their participation would have the unintended
effect of undermining to some degree marriage's ability to serve its
social purpose. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175 (1983)
(given State's broad concern with institution of marriage, it has
"legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct which may threaten that
institution").
As long as marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples who can at
least theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a
consistent message to its citizens that marriage is a (normatively)
necessary part of their procreative endeavor; that if they are to
procreate, then society has endorsed the institution of marriage as
the environment for it and for the subsequent rearing of their
children; and that benefits are available explicitly to create a
supportive and conducive atmosphere for those purposes. If society
proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who
cannot procreate, it could be perceived as an abandonment of this
claim, and might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has
little to do with procreation: just as the potential of procreation
would not be necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage would not
be necessary for optimal procreation and child rearing to occur.
[FN35] In essence, the Legislature could conclude that the consequence
of such a policy shift would be a diminution in society's ability to
steer the acts of procreation and child rearing into their most
optimal setting. [FN36] Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor
& Indus., 344 Mass. 695, 700 (1962) ("Legislative classification is
valid if it is rational and bears some relationship to the object
intended to be accomplished" [emphasis added] ).
The court recognizes this concern, but brushes it aside with the
assumption that permitting same-sex couples to marry "will not
diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex marriage," ante at,
and that "we have no doubt that marriage will continue to be a vibrant
and revered institution." Ante at. Whether the court is correct in its
assumption is irrelevant. What is relevant is that such predicting is
not the business of the courts. A rational Legislature, given the
evidence, could conceivably come to a different conclusion, or could
at least harbor rational concerns about possible unintended
consequences of a dramatic redefinition of marriage. [FN37]
There is no question that many same-sex couples are capable of being
good parents, and should be (and are) permitted to be so. The policy
question that a legislator must resolve is a different one, and turns
on an assessment of whether the marriage structure proposed by the
plaintiffs will, over time, if endorsed and supported by the State,
prove to be as stable and successful a model as the one that has
formed a cornerstone of our society since colonial times, or prove to
be less than optimal, and result in consequences, perhaps now
unforeseen, adverse to the State's legitimate interest in promoting
and supporting the best possible social structure in which children
should be born and raised. Given the critical importance of civil
marriage as an organizing and stabilizing institution of society, it
is eminently rational for the Legislature to postpone making
fundamental changes to it until such time as there is unanimous
scientific evidence, or popular consensus, or both, that such changes
can safely be made. [FN38]
There is no reason to believe that legislative processes are
inadequate to effectuate legal changes in response to evolving
evidence, social values, and views of fairness on the subject of same-
sex relationships. [FN39] Deliberate consideration of, and incremental
responses to rapidly evolving scientific and social understanding is
the norm of the political process--that it may seem painfully slow to
those who are already persuaded by the arguments in favor of change is
not a sufficient basis to conclude that the processes are
constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v.
Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 778 (2002); Mobil Oil v. Attorney Gen.,
361 Mass. 401, 417 (1972) (Legislature may proceed piecemeal in
addressing perceived injustices or problems). The advancement of the
rights, privileges, and protections afforded to homosexual members of
our community in the last three decades has been significant, and
there is no reason to believe that that evolution will not continue.
Changes of attitude in the civic, social, and professional communities
have been even more profound. Thirty years ago, The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, the seminal handbook of the American Psychiatric
Association, still listed homosexuality as a mental disorder. Today,
the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the American Psychoanalytic
Association, and many other psychiatric, psychological, and social
science organizations have joined in an amicus brief on behalf of the
plaintiffs' cause. A body of experience and evidence has provided the
basis for change, and that body continues to mount. The Legislature is
the appropriate branch, both constitutionally and practically, to
consider and respond to it. It is not enough that we as Justices might
be personally of the view that we have learned enough to decide what
is best. So long as the question is at all debatable, it must be the
Legislature that decides. The marriage statute thus meets the
requirements of the rational basis test. Accord Standhardt v. Superior
Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz.Ct.App.2003) (marriage statutes rationally
related to State's legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and
child rearing within marriage); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 313
(1971) ( "equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like
the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification
of persons authorized to marry"); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247,
262-263 (1974) ("There can be no doubt that there exists a rational
basis for the state to limit the definition of marriage to exclude
same-sex relationships").
D. Conclusion. While "the Massachusetts Constitution protects matters
of personal liberty against government intrusion at least as
zealously, and often more so than does the Federal Constitution," ante
at--, this case is not about government intrusions into matters of
personal liberty. It is not about the rights of same-sex couples to
choose to live together, or to be intimate with each other, or to
adopt and raise children together. It is about whether the State must
endorse and support their choices by changing the institution of civil
marriage to make its benefits, obligations, and responsibilities
applicable to them. While the courageous efforts of many have resulted
in increased dignity, rights, and respect for gay and lesbian members
of our community, the issue presented here is a profound one, deeply
rooted in social policy, that must, for now, be the subject of
legislative not judicial action.
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